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ABSTRACT 
 
“The school funding system in post-apartheid South Africa: Is the right to adequate basic 
education accessible to the rich only?” 
 
L.E. Arendse 
 
Masters Legum (LLM), Minithesis, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape. 
 
The financing of public schools in South Africa is dependent on school fees to a great 
extent. However, the legislative process governing the charging of school fees 
perpetuates the entrenched inequality in the education system and violates the 
constitutional rights of those learners who are unable to afford school fees and other 
educational costs. This study examines the impact of the school funding system on the 
right to basic education of these learners, who are in most instances black and/or poor.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to study 
One of the key features of Apartheid education was the gross inequality in the funding of public 
schools.1 The financing of public education under the previous regime occurred primarily on the 
basis of race, with black learners receiving the least.2 In contrast, the bulk of state funding was 
spent on former white schools. The effect of this unequal funding system manifested in a lack of 
basic infrastructure, insufficient learning material, unqualified teachers and overcrowded classes 
at the former black schools.3 The converse was of course true for the former white schools.  
Fifteen years after apartheid has been abolished, the current education system is still 
characterized by its legacy: former white schools continue to be adequately resourced whilst 
former black schools are entrenched in abject poverty.4 Since 1994, the democratic government 
has implemented a whole range of laws and policies to ensure that public funding is aimed at 
redressing this disparity and ultimately aimed at realizing the right to basic education of learners 
in terms of section 29(1)(a) of the South African Constitution.5 The financing of public schools is 
reliant on school fees to a great extent.6 Because the exact amount of fees charged is determined 
by the parent community of a school, there is great concern that the public funding system is 
reinforcing the existing inequality between former black and white schools.7 This argument is 
informed by the fact that wealthy (mostly former white) schools can sustain their position of  
                                                 
1 F Veriava and F Coomans “The right to education” in D Brand and C Heyns et al (eds) Socio- Economic Rights in 
South Africa (2005) 60.  
2 As above. For purposes of this study, “black learner” includes Africans, Coloureds and Indians.  
3 As above.  
4 South African Human Rights Commission: Report of the Public Hearing on the Right to Basic Education (2006) 2.   
5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
6 D Roithmayr “ Access, adequacy and equality: The constitutionality of school fee financing in public education” 
available from http://search.sabinet.co.za/WebZ/images/ejour/ju_sajhr_v19_n3_az.pdf?sessionid=01-62891-
8457662798format=F [accessed 22 June 2007].  
7 As above. 
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privilege by charging high school fees which enable them to operate on budgets far exceeding 
those of poor (mostly former black) schools which cannot charge similar amounts.8 A further 
concern is that learners are regularly refused access to schools and suffer discriminatory 
practices as a result of the inability to pay school fees.9  
 
1.2 Focus of study 
This study examines the extent to which the public funding system has impacted on the right to 
basic education of learners, in particular those who cannot afford the payment of school fees and 
other educational costs.  
 
1.3 Limitations of study 
Section 29(1)(a) entrenches the right to basic education, including adult basic education. This 
study excludes adult basic education. This study is limited to the basic, compulsory education 
guaranteed to learners from Grade R to nine or upon reaching the age of fifteen years, whichever 
occurs first in terms of section 3(1) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996.  
 
1.4 Overview of chapters 
Chapter two explores the normative content of the right to a basic education. Since the 
Constitutional Court has not clarified the content and concomitant obligations engendered by 
section 29(1) (a), I rely extensively on international law to provide relevant guidance as to the 
interpretation of the right.  
 
                                                 
8 As above.  
9 As above.  
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Chapter three examines the interpretation of the right to basic education in the specific South 
African context. 
 
Chapter four provides a detailed analysis of the regulatory framework governing the current 
school funding system. In this chapter, I primarily investigate whether government is complying 
with its constitutional obligations by assessing the impact of the school funding system on the 
right to basic education of black and/or poor learners.  
 
Chapter five concludes the study by summarizing the most import findings of the research. This 
chapter also provides legal and policy recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2. Introduction  
This chapter seeks to explore the content of the right to basic education and the concomitant 
legal obligations imposed on South Africa in terms of international law. Section 2.1 introduces 
the right to basic education as it is entrenched in the South African Constitution. Section 2.2 
represents the greater part of this chapter by providing an examination of the interpretation of the 
right in terms of international law.  
 
2.1The right to education as a socio-economic right 
Section 29 of the South African Constitution (the Constitution) provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right- 
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education, and 
(b) to further education, which the state through reasonable measures, must make progressively 
available and accessible. 
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in 
public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure 
the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable 
educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account- 
(a) equity; 
(b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices. 
(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent educational 
institutions that- 
(a) do not discriminate on the basis of race; 
(b) are registered with the state; and  
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public educational institutions. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational institutions. 
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Section 29 of the South African Constitution consists of a cluster of education rights and has 
consequently been called a “hybrid” right.10 This is because section 29(1) characterizes the 
socio-economic nature of the right whereas section 29 (2) and (3) are civil and political rights. 
As a socio- economic right, section 29(1) obliges government to make education available and 
accessible to everyone. Socio-economic rights create legal entitlements to material conditions 
that are required to satisfy basic human welfare, such as housing, health and food as opposed to 
civil and political rights which are concerned with the rights to speak, associate and make 
individual choices.11 As a civil and political right, the right to education provides freedom of 
choice guarantees seeing that section 29(2) confers the right to choose the language of instruction 
in a public educational institution whereas section 29(3) grants the freedom of choice between 
private and public education by recognizing the right to establish and maintain independent 
educational institutions.12  During the drafting process of the South African Constitution, various 
                                                 
10 Veriava and  Coomans (note 1 above) 60. 
11 D Brand “Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution” in D Brand and C Heyns et al 
(eds) Socio- Economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 1. 
The South African Constitution entrenches a number of socio- economic rights. These include section 26 which 
guarantees the right to have access to housing whereas section 27 provides for the right to have access to health care, 
food, water and social security. The remaining socio-economic rights in the Constitution are: 
- The right to a healthy environment: section 24. 
- The right of access to land, to tenure security, and to land restitution: section 25(5)-(9). 
- The right not to be refused emergency medical treatment: section 27(3). 
- The right of the child to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services: section 
28(1)(c). 
- The right of the child to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation: section 28(1)(d). 
- The right of every detained person , including every sentenced prisoner to conditions of detention that are 
consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment: section 35(2)(e). 
12 Other civil and political rights in the South African Constitution include the right to freedom of expression 
(section 16), freedom of association (section 18) and the right to vote (section 19).  
The socio–economic rights and the civil and political rights above are included in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2) of 
the South African Constitution.  The primary instrument on socio-economic rights in international law, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights together with the principal instrument on civil and 
political rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (including the Optional Protocol) serve to 
elaborate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These instruments constitute the International Bill of Human 
Rights. The international community has repeatedly confirmed that socio-economic rights are of equal status as civil 
and political rights and deserve equal protection. See for example, the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, reprinted in 9 Human Rights Quarterly (1987)  
122- 135. 
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objections were raised against the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution.13 These 
included that they were inconsistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers and were not 
justiciable.14 The South African Constitutional Court rejected these arguments. Firstly, it held 
that the fact that socio-economic rights have budgetary implications does not necessarily mean 
that it results in a breach of the doctrine of the separation of powers.15 The court noted that the 
implementation of civil and political rights such as freedom of speech and equality also often has 
budgetary implications.16 Secondly, the court stated that the “fact that socio-economic rights will 
almost inevitably give rise to budgetary implications is not a bar to their justiciability.”17 In a 
subsequent judgment the court adopted a stronger stance on this particular issue by pointing out 
that the justiciability of socio-economic rights had been “put beyond question by the text of the 
Constitution….”18 This study is concerned with the right to a basic education, entrenched in 
section 29(1) (a) as a socio- economic right.  
                                                 
13 S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (1999) 33-34. 
14 The original separation of powers doctrine is built on the notion that each arm of the State (the legislature, 
executive and the judiciary) is assigned a separate and independent function. Thus, the task of the legislature is to 
formulate laws and policies; the role of the executive is to execute those laws and policies and the judiciary is 
responsible for the interpretation of laws. The doctrine in its “pure” form was originally developed to protect society 
against an overconcentration of state power in one body. One of the objections raised during the drafting process 
was that the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution would result in the judiciary 
intruding into the domain of the other spheres of government by taking decisions that have budgetary implications. 
See Liebenberg (note above) 33-34 and M Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 383.  
15 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1999 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC)  paras 76- 78 (First Certification judgment).  
The original separation of powers doctrine (see note above) has changed over time with the introduction of “check 
and balances” in terms of which accountability is promoted by the different branches of government monitoring the 
exercise of state power by one another. An example of these “checks and balances” is judicial review of executive 
and legislative action.  Thus, an absolute separation of powers is impossible. Authors, such as Marius Pieterse 
argues that the boundaries between the different forms of government have become gradually more flexible. 
According to Pieterse, the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution has resulted in the 
judiciary increasingly deviating from its traditional role since these rights inevitably involve the judiciary in making 
decisions which have budgetary implications. For a thorough discussion of the development of the doctrine of 
separation of powers in South African constitutional jurisprudence, see Pieterse (note above).     
16 First Certification judgment (note above) paras 76-78. 
17 As above. 
18 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom andOthers 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) (Grootboom) para 20.  
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2.2 Interpreting the right to basic education in terms of international law 
The South African Constitutional Court has to date not considered the scope and content of the 
right to a basic education.19 In interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights, section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution requires of courts to consider international law.20 Moreover, the international law 
regarding socio-economic rights is more developed and nuanced than domestic law on the same 
topic.21 International law is therefore of significant importance in the interpretation of socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights.22  
 
The international instruments which will be referred to include the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the World 
Declaration on Education For All and the Dakar Framework for Action. At regional level, the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child will receive attention.  
 
Through the ratification of international conventions or treaties, South Africa has incurred 
obligations which it is required to enforce at domestic level.23 However, other legal instruments 
such as declarations, frameworks and recommendations do not have binding legal effect but they 
do impose moral commitments upon states.24 
                                                 
19 Veriava and  Coomans (note 1 above) 61-62. 
20 Section 39(1) (b) states: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum… (b) must consider 
international law…” 
21 P De Vos “The right to housing” in D Brand and C Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 89. 
22 As above. 
23 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx [accessed 17 July 2008]. 
Sections 231(1)-(3) of the South African Constitution describe the relevant processes in terms of which international 
agreements become binding on the country. In terms of section 231(4) an international agreement becomes legally 
enforceable in South Africa once it is enacted into law by national legislation. The South African Constitutional 
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South Africa has ratified the principal instrument on children’s rights, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.25 It has signed but not ratified the Convention against Discrimination in 
Education and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.26 However, 
the non- ratification status of these treaties does not prevent us from looking towards them as a 
guide in interpreting the right to basic education.27 Furthermore, through its signature of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention against 
Discrimination in Education, South Africa has incurred an international obligation to “refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the [relevant] treaty.”28  At regional 
level, South Africa has ratified the African Charter on People’s and Human Rights and the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.29  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Court, in Grootboom (note 18 above) at para 26 affirms that “where a relevant principle of international law binds 
South Africa, it may be directly applicable.” 
24 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm#core [accessed 17 July 2008]. 
25 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/124/21/PDF/G0812421.pdf?OpenElement [accessed 17 July 
2008]. 
26 As above. 
In a compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on South Africa’s  progress 
made in the ratification of international treaties, the South African government indicated, in 2007 that it was in the 
process of ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This compilation is 
prepared in accordance with paragraph 15(b) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1. 
27 In S v Makwanyane and Another (1995) 3 SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) (Makwanyane) at para 35 the 
South African  Constitutional Court held that binding and non- binding international law are applicable in 
interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
28 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.   
29 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/status.pdf [accessed 18 July 2008]. 
The full texts of the international law treaties are available from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.asp[accessed  1 March 2007]. 
The full texts of the regional law treaties are available from http://www.africa-union.org/official_documents/Treaties 
[accessed 1 March 2007]. 
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2.2.1 Sources 
This section indicates the protection afforded to the right to basic education in international law. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)30 was the first international instrument to 
give expression to the right to education.31 Article 26 provides that “everyone has the right to 
education” and that “education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.” 
It further states that “[e]lementary education shall be compulsory.”32  Since the adoption of the 
UDHR in 1948, the elements of “free” and “compulsory” have been attributed to the right to a 
primary education in the subsequent international instruments.  
 
Article 4 (a) of the UNESCO33 Convention against Discrimination in Education (CDE)34 requires 
of state parties “to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in the matter of education and 
in particular [t]o make primary education compulsory and free.” State parties are only required to 
make secondary education generally available and accessible.35  Similar to the UDHR, the CDE 
distinguishes two core elements of a primary education, namely making it compulsory and free. 
Whereas the right to primary education was included in the UDHR as a mere aspiration, the CDE 
was the first international treaty to include an obligation on State parties to provide free and 
compulsory primary education.36  
 
                                                 
30 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 1948.  
31 K Beiter The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law (2006) 90. 
32 As above. 
According to Beiter (note above) elementary and fundamental education are synonyms of primary education. It only 
differs as to the method of instruction.  
33 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Oganization. 
34 Adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on 14 
December 1960.  
35 Article 4(a) of the CDE. 
36 Beiter (note 31 above) 90.  
 
 
 
 
 10
The International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)37, in article 
13(2) (a) and (b) obliges State parties to make primary education compulsory and free whereas 
secondary education “shall be made generally available and accessible.”38 Article 14 of the 
ICESCR requires of state parties to work out a detailed plan to realize primary education within a 
reasonable time.39  
 
The Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has published various 
General Comments which are relevant to the right to education.40 General Comment No 341 
clarifies the nature of the obligations of state parties. General Comment No 1142 sheds light on 
the interpretation of article 14 and explains the meaning of the terms “free” and “compulsory” in 
primary education. General Comment No 1343 gives substance to article 13 by describing its 
content and the engendered obligations. This General Comment entrenches the so-called 4-A 
scheme developed by Katarina Tomasevski, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
                                                 
37Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XX1) of 16 
December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976. 
38 Article 13(2)  of the ICESCR provides: 
“The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of [the right to 
education]: 
(a)Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; 
(b)Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made 
generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education.” 
39 Article 14 of the ICESCR provides:  
“Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its 
metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, 
undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, 
within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in a plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge 
for all.” 
40 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is the body that monitors compliance by state parties of 
the rights in the ICESCR. The Committee publishes General Comments which guide the interpretation of the rights 
in the ICESCR. For a detailed explanation of the role of the Committee in international law, see 
http://www.ohchr.org [accessed 1 March 2007]. 
41 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No 3: The nature of states 
parties’ obligations: article 2(1) (1990).  
42 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No 11: Plans of Action for 
Primary Education: article 14 (1999). 
43 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No 13: The right to education: 
article 13 (1999). 
 
 
 
 
 11
the right to education.44 Lastly, General Comment No 1645 provides clarification on the equality 
provision46 and the principle of non-discrimination under the ICESCR. 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)47 protects the right to education of the child in 
article 28. Article 28(1)(a) obliges state parties to make primary education compulsory and free 
whereas article 28(1)(b) requires states to make secondary education available and accessible to 
the child.48 General Comment No 549 published by the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC Committee) provides clarity on the four guiding principles governing the interpretation of 
the rights in the CRC which will be referred to later.50 The General Comments published by the 
CESCR and the CRC Committee are not legally binding.51 However, they do carry considerable 
legal weight as authoritative interpretations of a relevant treaty.52 Moreover, in the absence of an 
“individual complaints procedure generating international case law” on the interpretation of 
socio-economic rights, General Comments provide an important tool to the respective 
                                                 
44J Sloth-Nielsen and B Mezmur “Free Education is a Right for Me: A Report on Free and Compulsory Education” 
(2007) 13. 
45 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No 16: The equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights :article 3 (2005). 
46 Article 3 of the ICESCR. 
47Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989, entered into force on 2 December 1990. 
48 Article 28(1)(a) to (c) of the CRC provides as follows: 
“State Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and 
on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
(a)Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b)Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational 
education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate measures such as the 
introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need.” 
49 Committee on the Rights of the Child: General Comment No 5: General Measures of implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: articles 4, 42 and 44 (2003).  
50 The CRC Committee consists of a team of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the rights in 
the CRC by the various State parties. These parties are under and obligation to submit regular reports to the 
Committee on their efforts made in implementing the rights in the CRC. Upon examining each report, the 
Committee makes its concerns and recommendations known to the State parties in what is termed “Concluding 
observations.” Similar to the CESR, the CRC Committee publishes General Comments which provide guidance on 
the interpretation of the rights under the CRC. See http:// www.right-to-education.org [accessed 1 March 2007]. 
51 Beiter (note 31 above) 365. 
52 As above. 
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committees to develop jurisprudence on socio-economic rights.53 According to Verheyde, 
concluding observations are merely country-specific and should therefore in principle be given 
less weight than General Comments.54 
 
At regional level, article 17(1) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (African 
Charter)55 provides that “[e]very child shall have the right to an education.” The African Charter 
does not expand on this brief formulation of the right to education.  
 
In contrast, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s 
Charter)56 provides comprehensively for the educational rights of the child.57 Article 11(1) states 
that “[e]very child shall have the right to an education.” Article 11(3) distinguishes between the 
various levels of education. State Parties are required “to provide free and compulsory basic 
education” but only encouraged to develop secondary education and make it available and 
accessible.”58 
 
                                                 
53 As above.  
The supervision of the obligations of States parties’ obligations in respect of socio-economic rights has generally 
been restricted to a periodic reporting system. In contrast, treaties entrenching civil and political rights provide for 
an optional individual complaints procedure (despite claims by the international community that these two sets of 
rights are equal in status). The absence of such a procedure in respect of socio-economic rights has resulted in the 
inability of treaty monitoring bodies to develop the normative content of treaty provisions through their application 
in concrete cases. See Liebenberg (note 13 above) 33-13, 14. 
54 M Verheyde A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 28 The Right to 
Education” (2006) 5.  
55 Opened for signature on 27 June 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, entered into force on 28 December 1988. 
56 Opened for signature on 11 July 1990, entered into force on 29 November 1999 AOU DOC CAB/LEG/24.9/49 
(1990).  
57http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/filedownload.php/2cd8c40932f7ffc0600732a4ddiscussion.right+to+edu...pdf 
[accessed 1August 2007].  
58 Article 11(3) provides: 
“State Parties to the present Charter shall take appropriate measures with a view to achieving the full realization of   
this right and shall in particular: 
(a) provide free and compulsory basic education; 
(b) encourage the development of secondary education in its different forms and progressively make it free and 
accessible to all.” 
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2.2.2 Preliminary Issues 
(a) Basic or Primary education? 
The terms “basic education” and “primary education” are sometimes used as synonyms in 
international law discourse. However, it is important to clarify these two concepts. According to 
the World Declaration on Education for All, “[t]he main delivery system for the basic education 
of children outside the family is primary schooling.”59 A “basic education” has been defined as 
“education that includes all age groups, and goes beyond conventional curricula and delivery 
systems, for example pre-school, adult literacy, non-formal skills training for the youth and 
compensatory post-primary programmes for school leavers.”60  A primary education thus refers 
to the formal process of schooling for children of primary school age whereas a basic education 
includes informal approaches to primary education.61 According to Sloth-Nielsen, primary 
education could be defined as the formal basic education given to children in primary schools by 
primary teachers.62 The South African Education Department defines a “basic education” as 
“….appropriately designed education programmes to the level of the proposed General 
Education Certificate(GEC)…”63A General Education Certificate is achieved at the end of the 
compulsory schooling phase: one year reception (Grade R) plus nine years to grade nine.64  In 
Phillips v Manser and Another65, the court confirmed that “in terms of the South African 
Constitution basic education is schooling up to the age of 15 years or Grade 9.”66  I will use the 
terms ‘basic education’ and ‘primary education’ interchangeably in this study.  
                                                 
59 Article 5.  
60 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) “Education For All: A Human Right and Basic 
Need. Policy for Sida’s Development Cooperation in the Education Sector (April 2001), 17.  
61 Beiter (note 31 above) 324. 
62 Sloth- Nielsen and Mezmur (note 44 above) 10. 
63 White Paper on Education and Training (March 1995) 37.  
64 As above.  
65 (1999) 1 All SA 198 (SE), 217.  
66 The applicant was 17 years old and in grade 11. Following his suspension, he argued that the conduct of the 
principal and school governing body in suspending him was an infringement of his constitutional right to basic 
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(b)  Prioritizing basic education: Jomtien to Dakar 
The discussion above points out that the major international law instruments prioritizes basic 
education above other levels of education by requiring of state parties to make it compulsory and 
free. The significance attached to realizing basic education for all children has led to the so-
called Education for All process which commenced in Jomtien, Thailand eighteen years ago.67 At 
the start of 1990, it was estimated that 100 million children worldwide had no access to primary 
schooling.68 This indictment against humanity led to the World Conference on Education for All, 
held at Jomtien in March 1990.69 The World Declaration on Education for All and the 
Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs were adopted at this Conference.70 The 
Framework for Action appealed to participating countries to set targets at national level for the 
achievement of various goals, including “universal access to and completion of primary 
education by the year 2000.”71 Ten years later, at the World Education Forum held at Dakar, 
Senegal in April 2000 it had to be conceded that the target of universal basic education had not 
been met.72 At the time of the Forum, 113 million children worldwide had no access to basic 
education.73 A revised plan of action was adopted called Education for All: Meeting our 
Collective Commitments: The Dakar Framework for Action.74 The Dakar Framework called 
upon participating countries to realize six goals by developing or strengthening national plans of 
action by 2002.75 These goals included “universal access to and completion of free and 
                                                                                                                                                             
education. The court held that since basic education means schooling up to the age of 15 years or grade nine, the 
right to basic education was not applicable to the applicant.  
67 Beiter (note 31 above) 323. 
68 As above. 
69 As above. 
70 As above. 
71 As above. 
72 As above, 326. 
73 As above. 
74 As above. 
75 As above. 
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compulsory primary education of good quality by 2015” and “improving all aspects of the 
quality of education.”76 South Africa, a signatory to the Dakar Framework committed itself to 
achieving these targets through the publication of the Plan of Action: Improving access to free 
and quality basic education for all in 2003 (National Plan of Action).77 In this plan of action, the 
government declares that it is “well on the way to attaining ….the provision of basic education 
that is compulsory for all children of school-going age, that is of good quality and in which 
financial capacity is not a barrier for any child…before 2015.”78 
 
(c)  Rationale for making basic education compulsory and free 
In 1921, the International Labour Organization (ILO) through ILO Convention No 10 linked free 
and compulsory basic education to the elimination of child labour by prohibiting employment 
which prejudices the school attendance of children.79 The minimum age of employment was set 
at the age of fourteen.80 ILO Convention 138 subsequently raised the minimum age of 
employment to fifteen.81 The rationale at that time and at present is that education, if guaranteed 
                                                 
76 As above. 
The remaining goals are as follows: 
- expanding early childhood care and education, especially for vulnerable children; 
- ensuring that the learning needs of young people and adults are met through access to learning and life 
skills programmes; 
- achieving a 50 percent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women; and  
- eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 and achieving gender equality 
in education by 2015. 
The World Declaration on Education for All, the Framework for Action to meet basic learning needs and the Dakar 
Framework are available at http://www.right-to-education.org.[accessed 1 March 2007]. 
The EFA process is co-sponsored by UNESCO, UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme), UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) and the World Bank. For a discussion on the 
role of these organizations in the EFA process, see http://www.unesco.org [accessed 1 March 2007].  
77 Department of Education (2003) Plan of Education: Improving access to free and quality education for all 
available at http://education.pwv.gov.za/DOE_sites [accessed 30 June 2007]. 
78 As above, 5. 
79 K Thomasevski Human Rights Obligations in Education: The 4-A Scheme (2006) 47.  
80 As above. 
81 As above. 
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unlocks the enjoyment of other human rights.82 Certain civil and political rights only obtain some 
meaning and substance when a person has had some form of education.83 For example, an 
educated person has the ability to make informed political choices, such as choosing a suitable 
political representative or political party or standing for public office. Education also plays a 
crucial role in the fulfillment of other socio-economic rights, such as the rights to housing and 
health as well as the right to food and work: education enhances a person’s prospects of securing 
employment which in turn secures access to food supply, housing and health care services.84 The 
denial of education often prevents the enjoyment of these human rights and perpetuates 
poverty.85 In Brown v Board of Education of Topeka86, the United States Supreme Court held 
that “…it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education.” According to UNESCO, the provision of free, compulsory 
primary education ensures that all children, irrespective of financial constraints can go to school 
which provides them with the necessary tools to participate actively in the economy and in 
society in general.87 Furthermore, education helps in the fight against HIV/AIDS and lays the 
foundation for using new technologies.88 The CESCR regards education as one of the best 
                                                 
82 As above. 
83 F Coomans “Clarifying the core elements of the right to education” in F Coomans et al (eds) The Right to 
complain about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1995) 2. 
84 As above. 
85 Tomasevski (note 79 above) 47. The CESCR, in General Comment No 11, at para 4, notes the following: “… 
[T]he work of the [CESCR] has shown that the lack of educational opportunities for children often reinforces their 
subjection to various other human rights violations. For instance these children, who may live in abject poverty and 
not lead healthy lives, are particularly vulnerable to forced labour and other forms of exploitation. Moreover, there is 
a direct correlation between, for example, primary school enrolment for girls and major reductions in child 
marriages.” 
86 347 U.S. 483, 1954.  
87http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev/php-
URL_ID=47065&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [accessed 19 March 2008]. 
88 As above.  
The role of education in the battle against HIV/AIDS is crucial to South Africa. The most recent statistics released 
by the Treatment Action Campaign reveal that one out of every ten people in South Africa is HIV-positive. 
According to the Department of Economics at the University of Free State the impact of HIV-AIDS on the South 
African economy is devastating. The impact of the disease is felt in almost all sectors of society, including the 
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financial investments states can make.89 This view was confirmed in the Dakar Framework  
which states that “[education]…is the key to sustainable development and peace and stability 
within and among countries, and thus an indispensable means for effective participation in the 
societies and economies of the twenty-first century…”90 The South African government 
reiterates the importance of basic education as “…the cornerstone of any modern, democratic 
society that aims to give all citizens a fair start in life and equal opportunities as adults.”91  
 
(d) Basic education and the interdependence of human rights 
Through its connection to other rights, the right to education symbolizes the unity and 
interdependence of all human rights.92 The principle of interdependency is built on the notion 
that “human rights should be treated holistically in order to protect human welfare.”93 Thus, 
rights cannot be seen in isolation but as co-dependent in securing that the welfare of human 
beings are best fulfilled. The fulfillment of civil and political rights is crucial to the enjoyment of 
socio-economic rights. For instance, the achievement of the right to equality through the 
eradication of discriminatory practices in schools is vital to ensuring the realization of the right 
                                                                                                                                                             
labour force, private sector, government and households. HIV/AIDS-related mortality amongst the economically 
active population leads to a decline in total labour supply; private firms will experience higher expenditure due to 
increased health care costs, burial fees and training costs and payment of other employee benefits, as well as 
absenteeism and a higher labour turnover;  HIV/AIDS will impact primarily on government  due to a higher demand 
for health services and the high costs of HIV/AIDS treatment; household expenditure is impacted by the care of and 
loss of HIV infected family members. This translates into losses of household income as well as higher medical and 
funeral expenses, which results in changes in expenditure patterns and in turn in private savings and in investment.  
See F le R Booysen, JP Geldenhuys, M Marinkov “The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the South African Economy: A 
Review of Current Evidence”: Paper prepared for TIPS/DPRU conference on ‘The Challenge of Growth and 
Poverty: The South African economy since democracy’ (2003). See also http://www.tac.org.za/community/aidsstats 
[accessed 7 August 2008]. 
89 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above) para 1.  
90 Note 76 above, para 6. 
91 Note 77 above, 4.  
92 Coomans (note 83 above) 2. 
The principle of interdependence is expressed in various international law documents, for example the Limburg 
Principles (note 12 above) at para 3; the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, reprinted in 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691 (1998) at para 4 and CRC Committee General Comment No 5 
(note 49 above) at para 6. 
93 Liebenberg (note 13 above) 33-31. 
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to basic education. The CESCR has confirmed that the elimination of discrimination is 
fundamental to the enjoyment of all socio-economic rights, including the right to education.94 
The CESCR sums it up aptly: 
[The right to basic education] has been variously described as an economic right, a social right and 
a cultural right. It is all of these. It is also, in many ways, a civil and political right, since it is 
central to the full and effective realization of those rights as well. In this respect, the 
right….epitomizes the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.95 
 
  
2.2.3 The right to basic education: clarifying its content and legal obligations 
Through its ratification of the principle treaties on the right to basic education and as a signatory 
to the Dakar Framework, South Africa has committed itself to achieving basic education for its 
children. However, the realization of its commitment depends on meeting the obligations 
engendered by the right to basic education. This is only possible if the content of the right is 
understood first. The CESCR General Comment No 13 provides the most comprehensive 
description of the content of the right to basic education in international law.96 To reiterate, this 
General Comment entrenches the so-called 4-A Scheme, developed by the former United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education. This scheme gives concrete content to the 
right to basic education. Furthermore, CESCR General Comment No 11 provides further content 
to the right by clarifying the two core elements of “free” and “compulsory”.97 Although South 
Africa has not ratified the ICESCR, the CRC Committee is of the view that where provisions of 
the ICESCR are similar in wording to that of the provisions under the CRC, the General 
Comments published by the CESCR should be seen as complimentary to those issued by the 
                                                 
94 CESR General Comment No 16 (note 45 above) para 3.  
95 CESCR General Comment No 11(note 42 above) para 4.  
96 Note 43 above. 
97 Note 42 above. 
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CRC Committee.98 Since the provisions on primary education under the ICESCR and the CRC 
are almost identical99, General Comment No 13 and General Comment No 11 should thus be 
viewed by all states which have ratified the CRC (including South Africa) as the principle guides 
in defining the content of the right to basic education.100   
 
2.2.3.1 Content  
All forms and levels of education, including basic education displays four interrelated features of 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability.101 According to Wilson who developed 
a complimentary legal framework in which to consider the 4-A scheme, available and accessible 
refers largely to the rights to basic education, whereas acceptable and adaptable refer to rights in 
education.102 Because the rights in education are primarily civil and political rights and this study 
is concerned with the right to basic education as a socio-economic right, the principal focus will 
be placed on the availability and accessibility features.  The relevant aspect of the acceptability 
feature is that the quality of basic education must be guaranteed.103 The issue of quality will 
receive further consideration when I assess what is meant by a “basic” education. Adaptability 
refers to the rights of children with special needs, such as the disabled and children who are 
                                                 
98 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 5. 
In Makwanyane (note 27 above) at para 35 the Constitutional Court held that binding and non- binding international 
law are applicable in interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights. The failure of South Africa to ratify the ICESCR is 
unfortunate (and ironic) in view of the fact that it had been the most influential human rights instrument in shaping 
the socio-economic rights provisions in the South African Constitution. The Covenant is therefore an essential 
source of interpretation in developing the socio-economic jurisprudence in South African law. Recently, the South 
African Human Rights Commission, in its report on the right to basic education, made use of General Comment No 
13 in describing the content and concomitant legal obligations in terms of section 29(1)a) of the Constitution. See 
Brand (note 11 above) 7.  
99 See section 2.2.1 above. 
100 Verheyde points out that because “article 28(1) of the CRC has largely been drawn up among the lines of article 
13(2) of the ICESCR, one may suggest that [the findings of the CESCR] may be read into the text of article 28(1) of 
the CRC.” See Verheyde (note 54 above) 28. 
101 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above)  para 6. 
102 Note 4 above, 9. 
103 Beiter (note 31 above) 627. 
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normally out of school, such as child soldiers.104 This particular aspect falls beyond the scope of 
this study and will not be addressed. 
 
2.2.3.1.1 Availability105 
This particular criterion broadly covers two aspects, namely the availability of schools and the 
availability of teachers.106 The availability of schools encompasses more than mere physical 
structures in which teaching can take place.107 Schools must be in such a condition which makes 
meaningful teaching and learning possible.108 This means that the school building must be in a 
good condition, learners must have access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities as well 
as teaching materials, libraries, computer facilities and information technology.109 The exact 
facilities that the state is obliged to provide depend on the developmental context within that 
particular state. 110 In section 2.2.3.2.2, I will distinguish between those facilities which states are 
required to provide immediately irrespective of their developmental context and those facilities 
which states may provide over a period of time as more funds become available to them.  
 
The second aspect of the feature of availability is that qualified teachers must be available. The 
Dakar Framework affirms that “professionally competent teachers” are required to ensure…[a] 
basic education.111  
 
 
                                                 
104 Sloth- Nielsen and Mezmur (note 44 above) 14. 
105 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above) para 6.  
106 Beiter (note 31 above) 479. 
107 As above. 
108 As above. 
109 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above)  para 6. 
110 As above.   
111 Note 76 above, para 65. 
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2.2.3.1.2 Accessibility112 
The availability of schools and teachers alone do not ensure that education takes place. In 
addition, children require access to school to guarantee their right to basic education. Having 
access to education does not simply mean that a learner is able to enroll at school. A child may 
enroll at school without completing the primary school phase.113 Hence, commentators such as 
Wilson argue for a distinction between enrollment and attendance.114 He suggests that learners 
may be prohibited from attending school on account of the inability to pay school fees despite 
being enrolled at the school.115 Moreover, the Education For All (EFA) Assessment of 2002 
indicates that the costs related to school fees, uniforms and transport prove too burdensome for 
some parents and are among the key reasons for non-attendance at school.116 Thus, in assessing 
the element of accessibility as one of the indicators in measuring whether the state is meeting its 
obligation in respect of basic education, the  focus should not be on the enrollment rate only but 
also on the success of the attendance and completion rate. I will now refer to the accessibility 
feature as described in General Comment No 13. According to this General Comment, 
accessibility has three overlapping dimensions.  
 
(a) Education must be accessible to all without discrimination. 
(i) Discrimination 
The primary purpose of the Convention against Discrimination in Education (CDE) is the 
prohibition of all forms of discrimination and the promotion of equal opportunities and treatment 
                                                 
112 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above) para 6(b).  
113 Italics my emphasis. 
114 F Veriava “Free to Learn: A discussion paper on the School Fee Exemption policy” in A Leatt and S Rosa (eds) 
Towards a Means to Live: Targeting poverty alleviation to make children’s rights real (2005) 9.  
115 As above. 
116 As above. 
 
 
 
 
 22
in education.117 Article 1(1) of the CDE defines discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, 
limitation, or preference [on prohibited grounds, including race, colour and economic condition] 
that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education.” The 
CDE118 as the most specific convention on discrimination in education prohibits discrimination 
in the following spheres: all educational levels, access to education, the standard and quality of 
education and the conditions under which it is given.119 Subjecting learners to conditions which 
are incompatible with human dignity constitutes discrimination under the CDE.120 The CESCR 
echoes the definition of discrimination under the CDE by stating that the principle of non-
discrimination entrenched in article 2(2) of the ICESCR prohibits differential treatment on a 
wide range of grounds, including race, colour and “other status”.121  Similarly, the CRC contains 
“other status” as prohibitive ground in its non-discrimination provision.122 The term “other 
status” suggests that the grounds listed in the above mentioned treaties are not exhaustive. 
According to the CESCR, “other status” includes “…a group of motives for discrimination, 
which have in common that certain groups in society have a particular social vulnerability or 
disadvantagement.”123 According to Beiter, disadvantaged groups usually enjoy equal treatment 
in terms of the law.124 However, he argues that in comparison to other groups their “socio-
                                                 
117 See preamble to the CDE.  
118 According to para 31 of CESCR General Comment No 13, the prohibition against discrimination as enshrined in 
article 2(2) of the ICESCR is interpreted in light of other treaties, including  the Convention against Discrimination 
in Education and the CRC. 
119 Article 1(2) of the CDE.  
120 As above.  
121 CESCR General Comment No 16 (note 45 above) para 10. 
122 Article 2(1) of the CRC provides: 
“States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their 
jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, 
birth or other status.” 
123 Beiter (note 31 above) 427.  
124 As above. 
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economic starting point” in life is not favourable.125 Hence, they do not have equal opportunities 
in exercising their rights.126 The CESCR has identified various groups as disadvantaged, 
including children of low-income groups, children from rural areas and children from racial 
minorities.”127 In Chapter 4, I will argue that the South African school funding system 
discriminates against learners on the basis of race and economic status.128  
 
(ii) Fair discrimination 
The concept of fair discrimination is recognized by the CESCR in that it supports affirmative 
action measures to bring about substantive equality for disadvantaged groups.129 Whereas formal 
equality assumes that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats everyone, irrespective of their 
circumstances the same, substantive equality takes account of the inherent disadvantage that 
certain groups of people may experience and is concerned that laws or policies do not maintain, 
but rather alleviate this disadvantage.130 Thus, laws or policies which prescribe affirmative action 
measures to bring the position of a certain group to the same level as that of another group are 
regarded as legitimate even though it means discriminating against certain people. This view is 
supported by the CRC Committee which emphasizes that the principle of non-discrimination 
under the CRC does not mean that everyone is treated exactly the same.131 In this regard, the 
CRC Committee endorses the implementation of special measures to eliminate conditions which 
                                                 
125 As above. 
126 As above. 
127 As above. 
128 Not all forms of discrimination are unlawful under the South African Constitution. Only unfair discrimination is 
prohibited. The South African Constitutional Court has developed a specific enquiry to determine unfair 
discrimination which I will discuss in the subsequent chapters.  
129 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above)  para 32.   
130 CESCR General Comment No 16 (note 45 above)  para 7.  
131 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 12. 
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cause discrimination.132 It has been suggested that the taking of special measures broadly means 
that greater financial and human resources should be allocated to disadvantaged schools than to 
schools occupied by children from affluent families.133 This includes the provision of additional 
qualified teachers.134 Of course, this is crucial to effectively address the inequalities in 
disadvantaged schools. Also, as an immediately available measure, it can accelerate the rate at 
which inequalities in schools are being diminished.  
 
(b) Education must be physically accessible. 
This means it has to be within safe physical reach or accessible via modern technology.135  The 
CRC Committee has recommended that states particularly ensure the availability of transport to 
rural children or the building of schools in isolated areas to make education physically 
accessible.136 This implies that the state is not only required to provide transport but has to 
employ any other suitable remedy to make sure that learners are able to reach school.  
 
(c) Education must be economically accessible. 
The CRC, in article 28(1)(a) guarantees that primary education shall be made compulsory and 
“free to all.”  This requirement is formulated unconditionally. Primary education is not only free 
to those who are financially constrained but also to those who are better off.137 The CRC, in 
article 28(1)(b) provides that secondary education should be made available and accessible and 
that state parties should “take appropriate steps such as the introduction of free education and 
                                                 
132 As above, para 30. 
133 Beiter (note 31 above) 409. 
134 As above. 
135 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above)  para 6(b).  
136 See for example CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Jordan (UN Doc. CRC/C/29, 1994) para 131 and 
CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN Doc.CRC/C/108, 2001) 
para 210.   
137 Beiter (note 31 above) 512. 
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offering financial assistance in the case of need.”  This suggests that states should only provide 
exemptions to school fees in respect of secondary education as exemptions are usually only 
granted in the case of need.138 Primary education, on the other hand should be completely free. 
The exact content of “free” primary education will be analyzed in section 2.2.3.2.2 when I assess 
the core obligations imposed upon states by the right to basic education. In this section, I will 
also explore whether free education should be made available to all primary school learners, 
irrespective of their economic status.  
 
2.2.3.1.3 Acceptability: What is a “basic” education? 
According to the Dakar Framework all children have the “…right to quality education…at 
whatever level is considered “basic.”139 The Framework emphasizes further that “[q]uality is at 
the heart of education”140 and that “[a] quality education is one that satisfies basic learning 
needs…”141 This Framework, to which South Africa is a signatory, therefore implies that the 
term ‘basic education” should not be confused with “low” quality education or an “inadequate” 
standard of education. Rather, it is my submission that ‘basic’ merely refers to the entry level of 
education. However, the question remains: What is the appropriate standard of a ‘basic’ 
education? In interpreting “primary education”, the CESCR obtains guidance from the World 
Declaration on Education for All which states that primary education must ensure that the basic 
learning needs of children are met.142 Article 1(1) defines “basic learning needs” as: 
                                                 
138 As above. 
139 Note 76 above, para 32. Italics my emphasis. 
140 As above, para 42. 
141 As above. 
142 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above) at para 9: “ The Committee obtains guidance on the proper 
interpretation of the term "primary education" from the World Declaration on Education for All which states: "The 
main delivery system for the basic education of children outside the family is primary schooling. Primary education 
must be universal [and] ensure that the basic learning needs of all children are satisfied…” 
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Every person - child, youth and adult - shall be able to benefit from educational opportunities 
designed to meet their basic learning needs. These needs comprise both essential learning tools 
(such as literacy, oral expression, numeracy, and problem solving) and the basic learning content 
(such as knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes) required by human beings to be able to survive, to 
develop their full capacities, to live and work in dignity, to participate fully in development, to 
improve the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions, and to continue learning. The scope 
of basic learning needs and how they should be met varies with individual countries and cultures, 
and inevitably, changes with the passage of time. 
 
According to the Declaration, the focus of basic education must be on actual learning acquisition 
and outcome rather than on mere enrolment and completion of education.143 Thus, achieving a 
certificate at the end of the compulsory school phase is meaningless unless the purpose of “basic 
learning needs” has been realized. Based on the definition above, basic education should 
empower an individual with the necessary training needed to ensure survival. This means that, at 
the least, a basic education should equip a person with the required skills to find employment in 
order to meet basic physical needs, such as food supply, housing, et cetera. In addition, it should 
also cater for the mental development of a person so as to ensure an individual is capable of 
interacting meaningfully in society. Furthermore, it should provide access to further education in 
order to have an improvement in the quality of life.  
 
However, Article 1(1) does not clarify the standard of basic education. The CESCR sheds some 
light by requiring the standard of primary education to be one of adequacy.144 In Campaign for 
                                                 
143 Article 4. 
144 Italics my emphasis. In describing the term “compulsory”, the CESCR, in General Comment No 11 (note 42 
above), at para 4, states the following : 
“The element of compulsion serves to highlight the fact that neither parents, nor guardians, nor the State are entitled 
to treat as optional the decision as to whether the child should have access to primary education. …It should be 
emphasized, however, that the education offered must be adequate in quality, relevant to the child and must promote 
the realization of the child’s other rights.”  
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Fiscal Equity v City of New York145 the New York State Court of Appeals identified three 
categories which are necessary to realize an adequate basic education: (1) teaching; (2) school 
facilities and (3) classrooms and instrumentalities of learning.146 Teaching includes ‘the quality 
of teaching staff…’.This element accords with the Dakar Framework which requires that 
teachers are competently trained.147 ‘School facilities and classrooms’ encompass ‘structures that 
protect learners from the elements.’148 This category includes water, electricity, sanitation 
facilities, desks and chairs.149 Finally, the ‘instrumentalities of learning’ refers to ‘textbooks, 
blackboards, stationary and possibly computers.150 Critics, taking into account the difference in 
developmental status between South Africa and the United States of America, may argue that a 
South African court will likely not have regard to a standard of adequacy laid down by a New 
York court. However, the latter standard confirms the international standard referred to in 
General Comment No 11.151 Furthermore, General Comment No 13 emphasizes that the 
developmental context of a particular state will determine the exact facilities that the state is 
required to provide in delivering basic education. States are therefore, not required to slavishly 
follow the standard laid down by the CESCR and the New York State Court of Appeals, but may 
adapt it according to the specific context prevailing in the country. The South African 
government has, to some degree, borrowed from this standard of adequacy. The Education 
Department declares that “[the right to basic education] would be satisfied by the availability of 
                                                 
145 100 NY 2d 893.  
146 As above, 908.  
147 As above. See also note 76 above, para 65.  
148 As above.  
149 As above.  
150 As above.  
151 It must be noted that the standard of adequacy laid down by the CESCR overlaps, to some extent with the 
element of availability described above. CESCR General Comment No 11 (note 42 above) at para 7, describes the 
right to free primary education, in part as “[ensuring]… the availability of primary education without charge to the 
child…” See also section 2.2.3.1.1 above.  
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schooling facilities sufficient to enable every child to begin and complete a basic education 
programme of acceptable quality.”152    
 
2.2.3.2 The right to basic education: What are the obligations upon states? 
In the previous section, I have analyzed the content of the right to basic education. This part of 
the study examines the concomitant obligations engendered by this right. Although the content 
has, to some extent, revealed the obligations incurred by states, section 2.2.3.2.2 distinguishes 
between core obligations, i.e. obligations which must be fulfilled without delay by states (unless 
the delay is justifiable) and non-core obligations, i.e. obligations which states are required to 
fulfill gradually. In international law discourse, the former obligations are derived, in part from 
the concept of the ‘minimum core’ content of socio-economic rights and the latter obligations are 
derived from the concept of the ‘progressive realization’ of socio-economic rights. Thus, before I 
investigate the specific obligations imposed upon states, these and other concepts of law have to 
be clarified.  
 
2.2.3.2.1 General Obligations 
The right to basic education, like all human rights, imposes three types or levels of obligations on 
states: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.153 The obligation to respect requires the state 
to refrain from impairing access to an existing right.154 Where this is unavoidable, the state must 
take steps to mitigate the impact of such impairment.155 This “negative” duty also prohibits the 
                                                 
152 Note 63 above, 37. The Oxford English dictionary describes the term “adequate” as follows: “satisfactory or 
acceptable in quality or quantity.” 
153 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above) 9. 
154 D Brand “The right to food” in D Brand and C Heyns et al (eds) Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa (2005 ) 
159. 
155 As above. 
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state from placing obstacles in the way of a person to gain or enhance access to the right.156 The 
obligation to protect requires of states to take steps to protect people’s existing access to a right 
and their ability to enhance and gain access to a right against the interference by third parties.157 
The obligation to fulfil means that the state must take positive steps to ensure that those lacking 
access to the enjoyment of a right gains access and that where access is insufficient, it is 
enhanced (positive obligation).158  
Article 4 of the CRC sets out the overarching duty imposed upon states by the right to primary 
education: 
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social 
and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their 
available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation. 
Article 2 of the ICESCR contains a similar provision: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
                                                 
156 As above. 
157 As above. 
158 As above. 
The case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria (Communication 155/96) provides an excellent rendition of the violation of all three elements of state 
obligations. In this case, the complainants alleged that the government of Nigeria violated a wide range of socio-
economic rights under the African Charter including the right to health and the right to a clean environment. 
According to the complainants the Nigerian government violated these rights through its involvement in oil 
production in Ogoniland, in particular by -  
- participating in the contamination of air, water and soil and hence harming the health of the Ogoni population 
(failure of the obligation to respect the right to health); 
-  failing to protect the Ogoni population from the damage inflicted on them by the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company (NNPC) and the Shell Petroleum Company but instead using government security forces to facilitate 
the harm (failure of the obligation to protect against interference by third parties) and  
- failing to provide or permit studies of potential or actual environmental and health risks caused by the oil 
operations (failure of the obligations to fulfil and respect).  
 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) agreed with the complainants and 
found an infringement of the alleged rights.  
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recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures. 
(a)“Progressive realization” and “to the maximum extent of its available resources”  
The provisions above introduce the concept of “progressive realization.”  This concept takes 
account of the reality that a lack of financial and other resources may hinder the full 
implementation of socio-economic rights in some states.159  Hence, it accepts that the full 
realization of socio-economic rights will not be achieved immediately or within a short period of 
time.160 However, the CESCR is of the view that the progressive realization of rights does not 
mean that the fulfillment of the right will never be achieved.161  States have a specific and 
continuing obligation“…to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” to ensure the full 
realization of the right.162 The CRC Committee emphasizes that states, irrespective of their 
economic circumstances are required to undertake all possible measures towards realizing the 
rights of the child, paying special attention to the most disadvantaged groups.163 The CESCR 
regards retrogressive measures taken in relation to education as impermissible.164 It has been 
suggested that the CRC Committee considers retrogressive measures such as a decrease in the 
education budget as incompatible with the word “progressively”.165 Thus, the whole notion of 
progressive realization does not mean that states can sit back and do nothing. States are under an 
obligation to take steps immediately and continuingly to work towards the realization of the right 
to basic education of all children. However, their chief priority should be to implement measures 
to make basic education a reality to those children who cannot afford the cost of schooling. The 
                                                 
159 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 7. 
160 CESCR General Comment No 3 (note 41) para 9. 
161 As above. 
162 As above. 
163 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 8. 
164 CESCR General Comment No 3 (note 41 above) para 9.  
165 Verheyde (note 54 above) 53. 
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South African Constitutional Court has endorsed the meaning of the term “progressive 
realization” as described above.166  
Article 4 of the CRC requires of States Parties to take steps “to the maximum extent of their 
available resources.” The “maximum available resources” include the resources available within 
a particular state as well as those available from the international community.167 The CESCR as 
well as the CRC Committee are of the view that international co-operation in this regard is an 
obligation upon all states, in particular those states who are in a position to assist.168 One of the 
focal points of the CRC Committee is the budgetary allocation for education.169 In its reporting 
guidelines, the Committee requests states to furnish information on the proportion of the overall 
budget devoted to children and allocated to the various levels of education.170 The CRC 
Committee, in its concluding observations is often concerned about an insufficient allocation of 
resources to education and thus welcomes an increase in the educational budget and frequently 
encourages states to increase budgetary allocations to education.171 The Committee is however 
silent about the exact proportion of the national budget that should be allocated to education, in 
particular basic education. It is my submission that its silence on this issue is due to the fact that 
budgetary allocation traditionally falls outside the sphere of the judiciary.172  The CESCR states 
                                                 
166 In Grootboom (note 18 above), the Court held at para 45 F-G: 
“Although the [CESCR]’s analysis is intended to explain the scope of states parties’ obligations under the 
[ICESCR], it is also helpful in plumbing the meaning of ‘progressive realization” in the context of our Constitution. 
The meaning ascribed to the phrase is in harmony with the context in which the phrase is used in our Constitution 
and there is no reason not to accept that it bears the same meaning in the Constitution as in the document from 
which it was so clearly derived.” 
167 CESCR General Comment No 3 (note 41 above)  para 13. 
168 As above, para 14 ; CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 1. 
169 Verheyde (note 54 above) 53. 
170 CRC Committee, General Guidelines regarding the form and contents of the periodic reports (UN Doc. 
CRC/C/58, 1996), para 26. 
171 See for example CRC Committee, Concluding Observations :Yemen (UN Doc. CRC/C/50,1996) para 51; CRC 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Lebanon (UN Doc. CRC/C/54, 1996) para 36 and CRC Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Uruguay (UN Doc. UN Doc. CRC/C/50,1996) para 117. 
172 See note 14 above. 
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that any deliberate retrogressive measures taken by a state needs to be fully justified by reference 
to the totality of the rights provided and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources.173 Thus, a retrogressive measure such as a decrease in the education budget would be 
very difficult to justify because states have the burden of proving that they have exhausted their 
own as well as international resources.174  
(b) Guiding principles in assessing the obligations imposed by the CRC 
In implementing the obligations imposed by the CRC, states are required to be guided by four 
articles identified as guiding principles by the CRC Committee.175 Articles 2, 3, 6 and12 enshrine 
these principles which embody the underlying requirements for any of the rights in the CRC to 
be realized.176 The CRC Committee has emphasized the importance of ensuring that the domestic 
law of state parties reflect the four guiding principles.177 Three of these principles will be 
considered here. 
(i) Article 2: the obligation of States to respect and ensure the rights set forth in the CRC to 
each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind. 
The principle of non-discrimination prohibits discrimination against any child in the sphere of 
education.178  States are required to actively identify individual children or groups of children 
who are experiencing discrimination.179 Marginalized and disadvantaged groups in particular are 
required to be identified and prioritized.180 Thus, states are under an obligation to take positive 
                                                 
173 CESCR General Comment No 3 (note 41 above) para 9. 
174 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above) para 45. 
175 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 12. 
176 http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Guiding _Principles.pdf [accessed 19 March 2008]. 
177 As above. 
178 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 12. 
179 As above. 
180 As above, para 30. 
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steps to identify whether discriminatory practices are occurring in schools. There seems to be a 
stronger obligation to identify discrimination against those children who are vulnerable because 
of their specific status.  This will undeniably include children who are barred access to school 
because of an inability to pay school fees or other educational costs, such as those related to 
transport or the wearing of uniforms. The CRC Committee stresses that addressing this 
discrimination may require changes in legislation, administration, resource allocation, as well as 
education measures to change attitudes.181 In addressing discrimination, states are thus urged to 
take action that goes beyond the adoption of legislation.  
As stated before, the Committee is of the view that the principle of non-discrimination does not 
mean identical treatment.182 Hence, special measures may be taken to diminish or eliminate the 
conditions that cause discrimination.183 Thus, even if the implementation of special measures 
discriminate against certain people, this does not constitute a violation of the principle of non-
discrimination if the object of such discrimination is to give priority to marginalized and 
disadvantaged children. For instance, if the state compels affluent schools to share their 
resources with disadvantaged schools this may amount to discrimination against wealthy parents 
on account of their economic status.184 However, this will not be a violation of the non-
discrimination principle since the purpose of the affirmative action measure is to eradicate 
conditions of inequality.  
 
                                                 
181 As above, para 12. 
182 As above. 
See section 2.2.3.1.2 above for an explanation of the difference between formal and substantive equality The notion 
of substantive equality is the underlying rationale for allowing fair discrimination against certain people in order to 
alleviate the plight of the marginalized and disadvantaged in society. 
183 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 12. 
184 These parents may argue that forcing them to indirectly finance the education of disadvantaged children amounts 
to discrimination on the basis of their economic status in society.  
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(ii) Article 3(1): the best interests of the child as primary consideration in all actions 
concerning children. 
This principle compels all courts of law, legislative bodies, administrative bodies and private or 
public social welfare institutions to always act in the best interests of the child when they are 
taking decisions which affect the child.185 According to Natasha Conception, this principle will 
apply to those circumstances where the rights of the child are in conflict with the prerogatives of 
parents and/or with those of the state.186 In those instances, this principle calls for the best 
interests of the child to prevail.187 The operation of this principle was illustrated in Laerskool 
Middelburg v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Departement van Onderwys188 in which the court 
interpreted section 28 (2) of the South African Constitution which entrenches the best interests of 
the child principle.189 This case concerned the plight of English speaking learners who were 
denied permanent accommodation at the Middelburg primary school by the school’s governing 
body.190 Although the school were legally entitled to adopt an Afrikaans medium language 
policy at the school, the court held that “section 28 establishes a fundamental right of every child 
                                                 
185 http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v7i2/child10years.htm [accessed 19 March 2008].  
186 As above.  
187 As above. 
188 2003 (4) SA 160 (T).  
189 Section 28 (2) provides: “A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child.” 
190 The single-medium policy at the school was validly established in terms of section 6(2) of the South African 
Schools Act. The latter section gives effect to section 29(2) of the Constitution which provides: 
“Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public 
educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and 
implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single 
medium institutions...” 
Initially, the school governing body, relying on the school language policy, refused the English speaking learners 
access to school. However, the Mpumalanga Education Department intervened and ordered the school to 
accommodate these learners.  
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to come first where there are competing rights” and ordered that “the interests of the relevant 
learners would best be served by allowing an English course to be created at the ... school.”191 
(iii) Article 6: the child’s inherent right to life and States parties’ obligation to ensure to the 
maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child. 
The third principle outlines the child’s right to life, survival and development. The child’s right 
to life is broadened by including the right to survival and development.192 According to the CRC 
Committee “development” includes the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological 
and social development.193 Children are thus entitled to opportunities, programs and conditions 
that will foster the “qualitative aspect of their survival.194 It is submitted that all aspects of the 
school life, including cultural and sporting activities contribute to ensuring that children develop 
to their full potential.195 In this regard, article 31 of the CRC requires that “States Parties 
recognize the right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities 
appropriate to the age of the child and to participate freely in cultural life and the arts.”  In 
implementing the right to basic education, state parties should therefore aim to ensure the child’s 
right to life and survival as well as the “optimal development”196 of children as required by the 
CRC Committee.  Thus, it is submitted that this particular principle does not only call for states 
                                                 
191 The court reached this decision after considering the report of a curatrix ad litem who found that the  “the new 
learners could easily have been accommodated in other schools, that the learners had adapted reasonably well at the 
... school, that the ... school was probably the best primary school in the area, that it was the nearest school to their 
homes, that the learners’ parents wanted them to attend the ... school, that a forced turning away of the learners 
would have a negative influence on them, that the learners might feel rejected, and that it would thus be in the 
learners “best interest” to stay at the ... school...” For an in-depth discussion of this case, see PJ Visser “Some ideas 
on the “best interests of a child” principle in the context of public schooling” 2007 (7) SAJHR 459.  
192 Note 185 above.  
193 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 12. 
194 Note 185 above. 
195 Section 29 (1) (a) of the CRC states that ‘the education of the child shall be directed to the development of the 
child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.’ This objective is repeated in 
section 11(2) of the African Children’s Charter. Article 13(1) of the ICESCR and article 5 (1) (a) of the CDE require 
that education shall be directed at the “full development of the human personality.”  
196 CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (note 49 above) para 12. 
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to ensure that children receive instruction in a particular curriculum at school. However, it 
encompasses a broad array of aspects, including the provision of nutrition and the participation 
of children in extra-curricular and sporting activities. These aspects are vital for the child’s 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development.   
2.2.3.2.2  Specific obligations 
In the following section, I will distinguish between the minimum core obligations engendered by 
the right to basic education and those obligations which only require progressive realization 
(non-core obligations).  
(a) The right to basic education and the notion of the “minimum core” in international law 
The concept of the “minimum core content” of a right to which “minimum core obligations” 
correspond is often referred to in determining the violation of socio-economic rights.197 The 
CESCR developed the notion of a minimum core to explain the core substance of a right and the 
corresponding minimum obligations which states must comply with.198 Coomans regards the 
minimum core content as the “essence” of a right: “that essential element without which a right 
loses its substantive significance as a human right.”199 It is the floor beneath which the conduct 
                                                 
197 CESCR General Comment No 3 (note 41 above) at para 10 provides: “[T]he Committee is of the view that a 
minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights is incumbent upon every State Party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of 
individuals is deprived of essentials foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of 
the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the 
Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely 
deprived of its raison d’ etre. By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has 
discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within the country 
concerned.” 
198 M Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 20 (2004) SAJHR 284. 
199 Coomans (note 83 above) 7.  
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of the State must not drop if there is to be compliance with the obligation.200  A failure to provide 
the minimum core obligations of a right thus results in a breach of the particular right. According 
to Coomans the right to free, compulsory primary education under the ICESCR is the minimum 
core of the right to education. He argues that primary education is so essential for the 
development of a person’s abilities that it can be “rightfully defined as a minimum claim.”201  
Coomans’ argument is strengthened further by the fact that the ICESCR regards basic education 
as so important that it imposes an immediate obligation on states to realize the right.202 The 
CESCR General Comment No 3 states that some rights in the ICESCR “would seem to be 
capable of immediate application by judicial and other organs in many national legal systems.” 
Article 13(2)(a)  is listed as one of these rights. According to the Maastricht Guidelines the 
corresponding core obligations to the right to basic education apply irrespective of the 
availability of resources and should thus be fulfilled by all countries, including developing 
countries.203 However, the CESCR does “take account of resource constraints applying within 
the country concerned” in assessing whether a state has discharged its minimum core obligations. 
204 Eide notes that if a State claims that a lack of resources is hindering the implementation of the 
core levels of the right, it must prove that this is because of reasons beyond its control and that it 
could not secure the assistance of the international community.205 Thus, although the minimum 
core obligations of the right to basic education may not be subject to “progressive realization”, it 
                                                 
200 This particular view was emphasized by the CESCR during its ninth session in December 1993. See UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/11, para 5. 
201 Coomans (note 83 above) 7. 
202 CESCR General Comment No 13 (note 43 above) para 51. 
203 The Maastricht Guidelines (note 92 above) paras 9-10. 
204  Note 197 above.  
205 A Eide “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights” in A Eide, C Krause, A Rosas (eds) Economic, 
Social  and Cultural Rights (2001) 27.  
 
 
 
 
 38
does not mean that states will have to enforce them immediately in all circumstances.206 Even if 
states are able to justify their non-compliance with the minimum core obligations, it is submitted 
that they are still under stringent scrutiny to ensure that the right to basic education is at least 
prioritized above other rights which are subject to progressive realization. Finally, although the 
minimum core is a right vested in everyone207 a minimum core approach to the realization of 
socio-economic rights prioritizes certain needs over others.208 This approach is justified by the 
argument that these “core” needs are most urgent.209  Thus, in the sphere of education, such an 
approach would require that the state “devotes all the resources at its disposal first to satisfy” its 
minimum core obligations in respect of disadvantaged learners before “expending resources on 
relatively privileged groups.”210 Roux terms this temporal prioritization.211 
 
(b) Core obligations 
Section 28(1a) of the CRC provides that “States Parties recognize the right of the child to 
education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal 
opportunity, they shall, in particular, make primary education compulsory and available free to 
all”. Sloth-Nielsen argues that “article 28(1)(a) states the core minimum:…“free” and 
“compulsory” education at the primary stage…”212 According to Verheyde, article 28 has to be 
read with article 41 of the CRC which provides that, if any standard set in national law, or other 
applicable international instruments are higher than those of the CRC, it is the higher standard 
                                                 
206 Although CESCR General Comment No 3 lists the right to primary education as a right “capable of immediate 
application”, the CESCR, in General Comment No 11, at para 10 provides that “The plan of action [which states are 
required to adopt in terms of article 14 of the ICESCR] must be aimed at securing the progressive implementation of 
the right to compulsory primary education...” 
207 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) No 15: The right to water :articles 11 and 12 
(2002) para 44(c). 
208 Wesson (note 198 above) 284. 
209 As above. 
210 T Roux “Understanding Grootboom- A Response to Cass R Sunstein” (2002) 12 Constitutional Forum 41, 47.  
211 As above. 
212 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur (note 44 above) 14. 
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that prevails.213 She claims that article 41 together with the significance the CRC Committee 
attaches to the notion of the minimum core and the strong advocacy for this concept in legal 
doctrine justifies her submission that the obligation to make primary education free and 
compulsory constitutes a minimum core obligation.214 Thus, the minimum core obligations 
engendered by the right to basic education can be derived from the concepts of “free” and 
“compulsory” assigned to primary education.215  
 
The CESCR, in General Comment No 11 defines the meaning of “free of charge”as follows:  
The nature of this requirement is unequivocal. The right [to primary education] is expressly 
formulated so as to ensure the availability of primary education without charge to the child, parents 
or guardians. Fees imposed by the Government, the local authorities or the school, and other direct 
costs216, constitute disincentives to the enjoyment of the right and may jeopardize its realization. 
They are also often highly regressive in effect. Indirect costs, such as compulsory levies on parents 
(sometimes portrayed as being voluntary, when in fact they are not), or the obligation to wear a 
relatively expensive school uniform, can also fall into the same category. Other indirect costs may 
be permissible, subject to the Committee's examination on a case-by-case basis.217 
 
(i) Availability 
The first overarching obligation to be extracted from this definition is the state’s obligation to 
ensure the availability of free primary education. The element of availability requires that the 
state provide the necessary resources to ensure that the basic infrastructure of schools is 
maintained. Furthermore, the state is obliged to provide safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, 
                                                 
213 Verheyde (note 54 above) 55. 
214 As above.  
215As above.  
216 Direct costs are directly produced by the educational service, including teacher salaries, provision of schools and 
their maintenance, and the management of the education system. Other direct costs include costs without which 
education could not be delivered, namely text and other books, learning materials, basic school equipment 
(stationary such as pens, pencils, rulers, etc.), and fees for examination. Indirect costs are indirectly caused by the 
educational service. These include transport costs (costs incurred to get to school) and costs related to school meals, 
school uniforms, sporting equipment, and further educational equipment. See Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur (note 44 
above) 10.  
217 CESCR General Comment No 11(note 42 above) para 7. 
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electricity, classrooms, desks and chairs to its learners. The provision of textbooks, blackboards 
and stationary constitutes a further core obligation as well as the provision of qualified teachers. 
Although many South African schools are in a deplorable physical condition218 and a good 
percentage of teachers are unqualified219, it is my submission that the abovementioned 
obligations are core obligations: without these, the right to basic education loses its significance 
as a human right. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the non-discrimination provision under the 
ICESCR and the CRC imposes an immediate obligation on states. This includes undertaking 
affirmative action measures in line with the concept of fair discrimination. In this regard, I agree 
with Beiter that the provision of qualified teachers to disadvantaged schools constitutes such an 
affirmative action measure. 220  
 
(ii) Accessibility 
General Comment 11 proceeds by distinguishing between the various costs incurred by 
education. The CESCR emphasizes that the scope of free primary education extends beyond the 
prohibition on charging school fees. Parents are exempted from other direct costs as well, such as 
fees for examinations, textbooks, learning materials and all basic school equipment. The CRC 
Committee is in agreement that direct costs, such as maintenance of school buildings and the 
supply of books and learning materials are free of charge and thus the responsibility of the 
state.221  Thus, the position seems to be that parents are not legally obliged to make any 
contribution that will supplement the direct costs related to education.  
                                                 
218 See note 288 below.  
219 See note 474 below. Generally speaking, states may argue that they do not have enough qualified teachers to 
deploy at schools. I concede that the process of training more teachers require time and financial resources.  
However, nothing prevents states from adopting policies which would result in qualified teachers sharing their skills 
among schools, thus accelerating the rate at which children are able to benefit from qualified teaching.   
220  See note 31 above, 409.  
221  Sloth – Nielsen and Mezmur (note 44 above) 16.  
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Indirect costs such as those related to school uniforms seem to fall under the scope of free 
primary education. In this regard, the CRC Committee notes that where the wearing of uniforms 
is mandated by school regulations, the state should provide for them, at least for poor children.222 
The overriding principle is that the requirement to wear uniforms should not lead to the 
exclusion of any child.223 Hence, the CRC Committee is of the view that the wearing of school 
uniforms should not be compulsory and that a disadvantaged child, in particular should not be 
excluded in any way for not wearing them. The CRC Committee holds the same view in respect 
of the transport costs of disadvantaged learners. The Committee has stated that the obligation to 
provide free primary education includes state subsidizing of transport costs for learners who 
cannot afford such costs.224 This view corresponds with that of the CESCR which provides that 
the right to equality and its corollary of non-discrimination is not subject to progressive 
realization.225 According to General Comment No 16, the right to enjoy socio-economic rights 
on an equal basis creates an immediate obligation on states parties.226 General Comment No 13 
confirms that states parties have an immediate obligation that the right to education “will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind.”227 The non-discrimination provision under the 
CRC is also regarded as imposing an immediate obligation.228 Coomans identifies the obligations 
to respect as part of the core content of the right to education.229 This means that states should 
realize these obligations immediately and irrespective of their economic development.230 States 
are thus under an immediate obligation to remove any impediment which may cause 
                                                 
222 As above. 
223 As above. 
224 As above. 
225 CESCR General Comment No 3 (note 41 above) para 5. 
226 CESCR General Comment No 16 (note 45 above ) para 16. 
227 CESCR General Comment  No 13 (note 13 above) para 43. 
228 Sloth- Nielsen and  Mezmur (note 44 above) 15. 
229 Note 83 above.  
230 Verheyde (note 54 above) 57. 
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discrimination against children in schools, including the charging of school fees and the 
compulsory wearing of school uniforms where parents are unable to afford it. States also incur a 
positive core obligation to identify discriminatory practices in schools and to address them.231 In 
the South African context, the eradication of systemic discrimination in the education system 
may take time.232 However, this does not prevent the government from immediately employing 
strategies to identify discrimination in schools and actively tackling it.233 This particular issue 
will receive further attention in the subsequent chapters. 
The element of “compulsory” provides further insight into the core entitlements engendered 
by the right to basic education. This element is described by the CESCR, in General Comment 
No 11, at para 6 as follows: 
The element of compulsion serves to highlight the fact that neither parents, nor guardians, nor the 
State are entitled to treat as optional the decision as to whether the child should have access to 
primary education. Similarly, the prohibition of gender discrimination in access to education, 
required also by articles 2 and 3 of the Covenant, is further underlined by this requirement. It 
should be emphasized, however, that the education offered must be adequate in quality, relevant to 
the child and must promote the realization of the child’ other rights. 
The South African government legally obliges all children in the compulsory school phase to 
attend school.234 In South Africa, parents are liable to pay a fine or may even be imprisoned if 
they fail to ensure the attendance of their children at school during the compulsory school 
phase.235 This obligation upon parents is necessary if considered that parental choice may be 
exercised to the detriment of the child.236 A parent may decide that a child should look after the 
household or contribute financially to the family by working instead of going to school. In this 
                                                 
231 See section 2.2.3.2.1 (b) (i) above.  
232 See section 3.2.1 below.  
233 As previously stated, the CRC Committee urges states to employ a wide range of strategies to address 
discrimination in education. These transcend the mere adoption of legislation. See section 2.2.3.2.1 (b) (i) above.   
234 Section 3(6) of the South African Schools Act.   
235 As above.  
236 Sloth-Nielsen and  Mezmur (note 44 above) 18. 
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context and for various other reasons, compulsory education becomes critical. However, nobody 
can do the impossible and hence parents cannot be under an obligation to ensure that their 
children attend school if they cannot afford the costs related to schooling.237 Thus, making 
primary education compulsory is contingent on making it free.238 Read with the first element of 
“free” primary education, the prohibition of non-discrimination and temporal prioritization in 
terms of the minimum core concept, it is submitted that states are under a core obligation to 
ensure that those costs related to ensuring the attendance of disadvantaged children at school, are 
free. This will include the costs mentioned above, including transport costs which have been 
documented to be bar to poor parents to ensure their children’s attendance at school.239 
 
The CESCR, in describing the element of “compulsory”, also holds that the standard of primary 
education should be adequate. As I have already discussed this concept in section 2.2.3.1.3 
above, it will not be repeated here, except for stating that states are under a core obligation to 
provide adequate basic education.  
 
In conclusion, states are under stringent scrutiny to fulfill core obligations urgently. Non-
compliance with these obligations should only be condoned where states have proved that they 
do not have the required resources and have failed to acquire the assistance of the international 
community. It is submitted that states should look beyond procuring financial resources, but 
explore all possible measures to realize the right to basic education, including utilizing existing 
resources of the more privileged schools. For example, governments should consider to legally 
compel more affluent schools to share their facilities with disadvantaged schools which may lack 
                                                 
237 Tomasevski (note 79 above) 21. 
238 As above. 
239 See note 114 above.  
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the means to enable the realization of the minimum core obligations engendered by the right to 
basic education.  
 
(c) Non-core obligations 
(iii) Availability 
In my previous discussion on the content of the right to basic education, it was noted that the 
exact facilities provided by states depends on the developmental context of the state. According 
to Verheyde, some facilities are indispensable irrespective of the specific developmental status of 
the state.240 These include basic infrastructure, such as adequate buildings, safe drinking water 
and sanitation facilities. In my discussion above, the provision of the latter facilities are core 
obligations. Verheyde also notes that the provision of facilities, such as computers and libraries, 
however, are only feasible in developed countries.241 The implication is therefore that developing 
countries do not have sufficient financial resources to provide the latter facilities. This may be 
true. However, this does not mean that these countries are exempted from making libraries and 
computers available to learners. Instead, they should aim to provide the basic facilities first242 
before extending more advanced resources to learners. The realization of libraries and computers 
are, therefore, subject to progressive realization.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
240 Verheyde (note 54 above) 16. 
241 As above. 
242 See discussion on core obligations above.  
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(iv) Accessibility 
The CRC Committee has emphasized that the principal reason for making primary education free 
is to avoid exclusion.243 It is submitted that schools will always consider it justifiable to exclude 
learners from school as long as they are permitted to charge school fees. Providing exemptions to 
disadvantaged learners however is not a lasting solution to the problem. Firstly, the obligation 
under the CRC is to provide free, compulsory primary education to all learners, not only learners 
from low-income groups. This means that the primary responsibility to provide free primary 
education is that of the state, not of the parents. Secondly, exempting certain learners and not 
others will not necessarily eliminate discrimination. Those learners who have been exempted 
may be classified at school as “poor and needy” and may be subjected to further discriminatory 
practices. However, in line with the minimum core approach, it could be argued that an 
exemption system is initially necessary to provide free basic education to disadvantaged learners 
first. The system should then be gradually phased out so as to provide free basic education to all 
learners as required by article 28(1). In this regard, and in line with my previous arguments, 
states are under a core obligation to make costs, which could potentially bar poor children from 
school, free. The CRC Committee has stated that the obligation to provide free primary 
education includes state subsidizing of transport costs for learners who cannot afford such 
costs.244 It is submitted that this obligation entails more than the mere provision of school buses. 
Subjecting learners to unreasonable lengthy hours on the road is detrimental to their optimal 
development. Hence, in the best interests of the child, other viable options should be considered 
such as hostels, boarding allowances, et cetera. However, in this regard, the CRC Committee has 
expressly provided that only transport costs are included under the core obligation to provide free 
                                                 
243 Sloth- Nielsen and Mezmur (note 44 above) 15. 
244 As above. 
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primary education.245 The implication is therefore that the provision of hostels, boarding 
allowances, et cetera is subject to progressive realization. Lastly, the state obligation to provide 
sport and cultural facilities cost-free to learners, is also subject to progressive realization. Again, 
the CRC Committee has not expressly included the obligation to provide the latter facilities 
under the umbrella of free, primary education.246 Furthermore, although the provision of these is 
necessary for the optimal development of the child and is in the best interests of the child, it is 
not an obligation without which the right to basic education would lose its core character.  
 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
South Africa has a key obligation under the Convention on the Rights of the Child to realize 
basic education  for all its children in the primary school phase. Although this obligation requires 
progressive realization, it does not mean that this goal can be indefinitely delayed. Other 
international instruments such as the African Charter and the African Children’s Charter impose 
an immediate obligation on the country to provide basic education. A sense of urgency has also 
been created by South Africa’s commitment to the Dakar Framework in which it commits itself 
to realizing free, compulsory basic education before 2015. In line with the notion of the 
minimum core, South Africa is obliged to provide the following to disadvantaged learners first: 
free, compulsory basic education, equal access to education and the right to an adequate basic 
education. Once these minimum core obligations have been achieved, the right to basic 
education has to be fully realized to all children in accordance with article 28(1)(a) of the CRC.  
 
                                                 
245 As above, 15.  
246 As above, 16.  
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CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 3. Introduction 
This chapter explores the right to basic education in its South African context. In particular, I 
will examine the social and historical context and thereafter the textual context of the right. I will 
also determine whether the unqualified nature of the right means that the right is not subject to 
the standard of reasonableness established by the Constitutional Court in assessing whether the 
state has discharged its constitutional obligations in respect of socio-economic rights.  
  
3.1. The transformative South African Constitution 
The South African Constitution, through its entrenchment of socio-economic rights, embodies a 
transformative model of constitutionalism.247 This differs from traditional liberal constitutions 
which only place restraints on the exercise of state power.248 Besides providing measures to curb 
an abuse of state power, the transformative Constitution also requires of government to take 
steps “to advance the ideals of freedom, equality, dignity and social justice.”249 The 
                                                 
247 Brand (note 11 above) 1. 
The term “transformative constitutionalism” was created by Karl Klare. He explains the term as follows: 
“By transformative constitutionalism, I mean a long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in historical context of conductive political developments) to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of including large-scale social change 
through non-violent political progress grounded in law.”  
 Transformation is defined by Albertyn and Goldblatt as: 
“a complete reconstruction of the state and society, including a distribution of power and resources along egalitarian 
lines. The challenge of achieving equality within this transformation project involves the eradication of systematic 
forms of domination and material disadvantage based on race, gender, class and other grounds of inequality. It also 
entails the development of opportunities which allow people to realize their full human potential within positive 
social relationships.”  
For a thorough discussion of the nature of the transformative South African Constitution, see K Klare “Legal culture 
and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) SAJHR 146; C Albertyn and B Goldblatt “Facing the challenge of 
transformation: difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality” (1998) SAJHR 248. The 
transformative nature of the Constitution is also confirmed in the preamble which states: 
“The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, adopted to heal the divisions of the past, to establish a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights and to improve the quality of life of all 
citizens and free the potential of all people.”  
248 Brand (note 11 above) 1. 
249 As above. 
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transformation of the South African society into one characterized by these constitutional values 
are made attainable by the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution.250 The 
justiciability of these rights imposes a constitutional obligation upon the state to “realize housing, 
educational and social security objectives, which cannot be left merely to the mechanisms of the 
free market for fulfillment.”251 Therefore, “[t]he purpose of the transformative Constitution is not 
merely to protect [existing] rights, but also to empower disadvantaged persons and to contribute 
to the amelioration of social evils such as poverty, illiteracy and homelessness.”252 The 
underlying political philosophy of socio-economic rights involves implementing policies to 
alleviate the plight of the disadvantaged in our society.253  This philosophy is entrenched in the 
South African Constitution which lists the establishment of a society built on social justice as 
one of its fundamental objectives.254 Beiter is of the view that the underlying concept for making 
socio-economic rights justiciable is that certain social services such as basic health care and 
education should be accessible to all, irrespective of the ability to pay for these services.255 
According to Liebenberg the inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in the South 
                                                 
250 As above, 3.   
251 GE Devenish “The nature, evolution and operation of socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution” 
(2007) THRHR 85.  Economic experts agree that education is a public good because the market is unable to provide 
adequate public education to learners based on their ability to pay. They argue that poor families cannot obtain 
sufficient credit to pay school fees, they are also mostly in a position where they are unable to gain access to 
information that will enable them to make an accurate assessment of the benefits of education and they are less 
likely to invest in education because of the long-term risks attached to it. Based on these reasons, the majority of 
experts agree that the state should be the primary funder of education. See for example T Roux “Comment on 
Department of Education’s Report to the Minister: Review of the Cost, Resourcing and Funding of Education in 
Public Schools” (30 April 2003) 8.  Roux refers here to C Colclough ‘Education and the Market: Which Parts of the 
Neoliberal Solution are Correct?’ (1996) 24 World Development; R Venugopal ‘Oxford University Development 
Seminar’ Queen Elizabeth House (2002), World Bank World Development Report (1995).  
252 Devenish (note above) 85. 
253 As above. Devenish defines socio-economic rights policies as “policies of human compassion, sharing and 
caring.”   
254 Preamble to the South African Constitution. 
255 Beiter (note 31 above) 490.  
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African Bill of Rights confirms the fundamental importance that the Constitution attaches to the 
redress of poverty.256   
 
3.2 Interpreting socio-economic rights in context 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court held that a right in the Bill of Rights cannot be 
interpreted in isolation but must be construed in its proper context.257 This requires the 
interpretation of two types of context.258 Firstly, a right must be understood in its social and 
historical context.259 This entails an understanding of the right against our specific “history and 
background to the adoption of the Constitution.”260 This specific context was aptly described by 
Chaskalson P in Soobramoney: 
“We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, in social 
security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These 
conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, 
and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, 
lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist 
that aspiration will have a hollow ring.”261 
                                                 
256 Liebenberg (note 13 above) 33-32. 
257Grootboom (note 18 above) para 21.  
This contextual approach by the Constitutional Court is also known as the “purposive” or “generous” approach.  
See, for example Makwanyane (note 27 above) at para 9; S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC); 1995 (4) BCLR 104 (CC) 
at para 15 (the Court refers here with approval to the Canadian case of  R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR 
(4th) 321 where it was held that a right must be understood in light of its purpose or “the interests it was meant to 
protect.”); President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (Hugo) 
at para 41; Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 
(CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (Khosa) at paras 40-49.  
258Grootboom (note 18 above) para 22. 
259As above, para 25.  
260Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu – Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 
(Soobramoney) para 16. 
261As above, para 8. This passage also confirms the transformative nature of the South African Constitution. 
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This passage suggests that an understanding of the scope and content of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights is firstly dependent on the history that preceded our constitutional democracy.262 This 
history has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court as the specific apartheid history in which 
the majority of the South African population were denied their political freedom and deprived of 
opportunities to advance their economic and social position in life.263 Consequently, many of 
these South Africans are still living in conditions of poverty which contribute to a denial of their 
basic human rights.264 At the core of the transformative constitution lies a commitment to 
address these conditions in order to ensure a future country in which the constitutional values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom will be enjoyed by all. The role of the Constitution in 
facilitating this future has been equated to a “historic bridge between the past …characterized by 
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
existence and development opportunities for all South Africans…”265 A mere understanding of 
the specific historical context of a right is thus not enough. In order to realize the goals of the 
transformative constitution, an interpretation of the right must be aimed at rectifying the 
injustices of the past.  
                                                 
262 P De Vos “Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as contextual fairness” (2001) 17 
SAJHR 262-263.  
263 As above, 263. 
264 The South African government recently published “Towards a 15 year review”, a report which tracks its progress 
in improving the quality of life of all South Africans since 1993. In assessing poverty levels in South Africa, two 
poverty lines were used: a lower poverty line of R174 per person per month and a higher poverty line of R322 per 
person per month. In 1995, 63.04 % of Africans, 39 % of Coloureds, 4.7% of Asians and 0.53% of whites lived on a 
monthly income of R322. In 2005, 24.44 % of Africans, 12.98 % of Coloureds, 2.17% of Indians and 0.11% of 
Whites received a monthly income of R322. In 1995, 38.18% of Africans, 14.62% of Coloureds, 0.82% of Asians 
and 0.23% of Whites received a monthly income of R174. In 2005, 8.55% of Blacks, 3.88% of Coloureds, 1.07% of 
Asians and 0% of Whites lived on a monthly income of R174.  The decline in poverty among all groups is primarily 
due to government’s social security assistance program. In 2005, social assistance grants contributed to 90% of the 
income of Africans and Coloureds. This indicates that the past patterns of racial inequality are still persisting. The 
South African government concedes that there is still persistent inequality in “…income, resources, skills, and other 
determinants of people’s capacity to take advantage of opportunities.” “Towards a 15 year review” is accessible 
from http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2008/toward_15year_review.pdf [accessed 8 October 2008].   
265 These words are contained in the first paragraph of the provision on National Unity and Reconciliation which 
concludes the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. Section 232(4) of the Interim Constitution provides that the 
provision on National Unity and Reconciliation forms part of the substance of the Constitution and has no lesser 
status than any other provision in interpreting the Constitution.  
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The second leg of the contextual approach requires that rights must be interpreted in their textual 
setting.266 This requires an interpretation of the other rights in the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution as a whole.267 The Constitutional Court, in Makwanyane describes the contextual 
approach as construing rights in the Bill of Rights in such a way so as to provide individuals the 
“full measure of the protection” of the Constitution268: In determining the constitutionality of the 
death penalty269, the Court interpreted the meaning of the prohibition of “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” under section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution.270 Firstly, 
the Court looked at all the rights associated with section 11(2), namely the rights to life, dignity 
and equality.271 The court then held that punishment in terms of section 11(2) must “meet the 
requirements” of the associated rights.272 Since Makwanyane, the Court has followed the same 
approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights. In Grootboom the court emphasized the 
interrelated and mutual link between socio-economic rights and the other rights enshrined in the 
Constitution by pointing out that: 
There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our 
society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to 
all people therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2. The realisation of 
these rights is also key to the advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution of a 
society in which men and women are equally able to achieve their full potential.273 
                                                 
266 Grootboom (note 18 above) para 22. 
267 As above. 
268 Makwanyane (note 27 above) para 10.  
269 Under the previous section 277(1) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act the death penalty was a competent sentence 
for murder. This section was declared unconstitutional in Makwanyane (note 27 above) at para 344.  
270 As above. Section 11 (2) of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 provides: “No person shall be subject to 
torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 
271 As above. 
272 As above. 
273 Grootboom (note 18 above) para 23.  
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In Khosa, the court held that the rights to life, equality and dignity must be considered where it is 
implicated in cases dealing with socio-economic rights274: In interpreting the right to social 
security under section 27(1)(c)275 of the Constitution, the court found that the denial of social 
security to permanent residents is a not only a violation of section 27, but also of their rights to 
equality and dignity which were described as founding values lying “at the heart of the Bill of 
Rights.”276 This judgment coupled with the abovementioned passage from Grootboom seem to 
suggest that where the values of dignity, equality, life and freedom are implicated in socio-
economic rights claims, it will be very difficult to justify an infringement of the socio-economic 
right and vice versa.  
 
I shall now proceed to interpreting the right to basic education, firstly in its social and historical 
context and secondly in its textual context.  
 
3.2.1 Social and historical context of section 29(1)(a): The legacy of apartheid 
Formal schooling in South Africa is rooted in missionary and colonial forms of education.277 
During the 1950’s, education was removed from missionary control and brought under the 
control of the ruling National Party government.278  Three “own affairs” systems were instituted 
which catered for Whites, Coloureds and Indians respectively.279 The administration of black 
education was divided between six self-governing territory departments, a central department for 
                                                 
274 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development 
2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004(6) BCLR 569 (CC) (Khosa) paras 40-44.  
275 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution provides: “Everyone has the right to have access to social security, including 
if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.” 
276 Khosa (note 274 above) para 85.  
277 South African Human Rights Commission: “A report on racism, racial integration and desegregation in South 
African public secondary schools” (February 1999) 19.  
278 As above.  
279 Note 63 above, 13. Former White schools were administered by the House of Assembly (HOA), former Coloured 
schools were managed by the House of Representatives (HOR) and the former Indian schools were governed by the 
House of Delegates (HOD). (See note 277 above, 17). 
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Africans living in “white South Africa”280 and four nominally independent state departments.281 
The allocation of policy and budgetary initiatives was administered by the then Department of 
National Education.282  The allocation of funding by this Department reflected the gross 
inequality in the education system with black schools receiving the least from a government 
committed to white supremacy.283 Former white schools did not only receive more resources 
than other racial groups but were also entitled to a higher standard of education.284 Blacks were 
taught a limited curriculum in line with the concept of “Bantu education” which was premised on 
the Verwoerdian concept that “education must train and teach people in accordance with their 
opportunities in life.”285  Not surprisingly, the education system inherited by the post-apartheid 
                                                 
280 This term refers to the territory of the Republic of South Africa, excluding the so-called Bantustan homelands 
which were created by the Apartheid regime. In terms of the Bantustan policy, black South Africans were classified 
according to their tribal heritage and forced to accept citizenship of the appropriately designated homelands. See, for 
example the Representation between Republic of South Africa and Self-Governing Territories Act (Promotion of 
Bantu Self-Government Act) 46 of 1959 available from http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/special-
chrono/governance/apartheid-legislation.html [accessed 18 September 2008]. 
281 Note 63 above, 13. The former Department of Education and Training (DET) supervised former black schools 
(Note 277 above, 27).  
282 Note 63 above, 13.  
283 In 1986, the apartheid government spent R2 635 per year on every white child in comparison to R572 per every 
black child. In 1994, the annual expenditure on education was as follows: R5043 per White child; R4787 for each 
Indian child; R3691 for each Coloured child and between R2184 and R1053 per African child. See F Veriava 
“Education Rights” in S Khoza et al (ed) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Resource Book (2007) (2nd ed) 
413. See also note 277 above.  
284 Education Rights Project: The Law and Transformation Programme, Centre for Applied Legal Studies and the 
Education Policy Unit, Framework Document, 9 available from http://www.erp.org.za [accessed 19 July 2007]. 
285 As above. 
During his term as Minister of Bantu Education, Hendrik Verwoerd (notoriously known as the architect of 
Apartheid) made the following statement: “If the Native in South Africa today in any kind of school in existence is 
being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under the policy of equal rights, he is making a big 
mistake…There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour…[r]acial 
relations cannot improve if the wrong type of education is given to Natives. They cannot improve if the result of the 
Native education is the creation of frustrated people, who as the result of education they received, have expectations 
of life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled immediately, when it creates people who are 
trained for professions not open to them, when there are people who have received a form of cultural training which 
strengthen their desire for white collar occupations to such an extent that there are more such people than openings 
available. Therefore, good racial relations cannot exist when the correct education is not given. Above all, good 
racial relations cannot exist when the education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations 
on the part of the Native himself.” See, for example Veriava and Coomans (note 1 above) 60. The Black Education 
Act 47 of 1953 is available from http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/special-
chrono/governance/apartheid-legislation.html [accessed 18 September 2008].  
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government is “riddled with inequalities.”286 South Africa, in reality still harbors separate 
education systems in its public school domain: the one consists of the former Model C 
schools287, which is adequately resourced and the other constitutes the township and rural 
schools entrenched in abject poverty.288 The legacy of Apartheid education manifested in a 
minimum level of resources, a lack of qualified teachers, high teacher-pupil ratios, a lack of 
libraries and laboratories and a shortage of classrooms at the latter schools.289 On the other hand, 
most of the former Model C schools are equipped with modernized computers, well-resourced 
libraries and laboratories and well qualified teachers.290 In 2008, it was estimated that the former 
Model C schools are charging school fees ranging anywhere between R5400 and R20 000 a 
year.291  On the other hand school fees in previously disadvantaged schools can be as minimal as 
R50 per year.292 Because funding under the Apartheid government occurred primarily along 
racial lines, there continues to be a strong correlation between a former department in which a 
school was located and the race of the learners it served.”293 However, the former Model C 
schools are generally open to learners who can afford the school fees. Thus, an increasing 
                                                 
286 South African Human Rights Commission: Socio-Economic Rights Report (2001), 88. 
287 “Model C” is generally used to describe the former white schools as they existed under the previous regime. 
However, this term requires explanation. In April 1992, the then Minister of Education announced that all white 
schools would become Model C status schools. This meant that these schools would be converted into state-aided 
schools managed by the principal and a management committee. The state paid the salaries of a set number of 
teachers whilst the rests of the costs at these schools became the responsibility of the parents. The management 
committee had the power to appoint teachers, determine admission policy and impose fees. Although, in theory, 
white schools could admit black pupils as from October 1990, many black learners were barred access to these 
schools due to the charging of high school fees and the failure to meet certain selection criteria which, in fact 
disguised racism. See note 277 above.  
288 In its third Socio-Economic Rights Report, the South African Human Rights Commission  disclosed the 
following data on the state of South African schools: 2 280 schools have buildings in a very poor condition; 10 723 
schools have a shortage of classrooms; 13 204 schools have inadequate textbooks; 8 142 195 learners live beyond a 
5-kilometre radius from school; 10 859 schools are without electricity; 9 638 schools are without telephones; 2 496 
schools are without adequate toilets; 19 085 schools do not have access to computer facilities; 21 773 schools lack 
access to library facilities and 17 762 lack access to recreational and sporting facilities. 
See note 4 above. 
289 Veriava and  Coomans (note 1 above) 60; Note 277 above, 20.  
290 Note 6 above.  
291 http://www.thetimes.co.za/PrintEdition/News/Article.aspx?id=875626 [accessed 7 November 2008].  
292 Veriava (note 114 above), 11.  
293 As above, 15. 
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amount of black learners are gaining access to these schools. The socio-economic status of a 
learner has thus become a determining factor in respect of the choice of school a learner 
attends.294  As I will show below the funding system excludes learners from access to schools on 
account of race and socio-economic status. In some cases, there may be an overlap. The right to 
basic education must therefore be interpreted against this background of an education system 
segregated along racial and/or class lines.  
 
3.2.2Textual context: Section 29(1)(a) and the related provisions in the Bill of Rights 
The significance of section 29(1)(a) in the realization of other rights has been discussed in great 
detail in the previous chapter.295 To reiterate, the right to basic education plays a central role in 
the fulfillment of both socio-economic and civil and political rights.296 Education is vital to 
gaining access to the labour market. A person with no formal schooling has a thirty percent 
chance of unemployment whereas a person with a tertiary education has less than five percent.297  
Furthermore, education is the greatest determining factor in South Africa regarding salaries: A 
person with no formal schooling earns 21 times less income in a lifetime than a person with a 
tertiary education.298 Obtaining at least matric guarantees the income of a salary double of a 
person with a grade 11 qualification.299  These figures indicate that the level of education 
determines a person’s quality of living. The lower the level of education, the slimmer an 
individual’s chance is of generating a decent income and securing a decent standard of living. 
                                                 
294 As above. 
295 See section 2.2.2 (c) above.  
296 As above. 
297 M Schussler “What are you worth?” 7th United Association of South Africa (UASA) Employment Report (2008), 
13 accessible from http://www.skillsportal.co.za/human_resource_management/910744.htm [accessed 30 May 
2008].  
298 As above, 13. According to Schussler (note above), the average salary of an uneducated person is R2500 per 
month, provided he/she works for a period of fifty years. Taking into account that most people do not work for such 
a long period of time, in reality the average salary is much lower.  
299 As above, 10. 
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Because income is crucial to the affordability of socio-economic services, it is safe to argue that 
most uneducated people are left dependent on the state for the fulfillment of socio-economic 
rights, such as housing and health rights.300 As will be shown below, these rights cannot be 
fulfilled immediately by the state.  Therefore, a denial of the right to education inevitably results 
in a denial of other socio-economic rights in the Constitution. 
 
Education implicates the right to equality301: a denial of education prohibits a person from 
competing on equal footing with those who are educated in the pursuit of opportunities to ensure 
an improved quality of life. However, once a poor child receives an education equal to that of 
one more fortunate, both have an equal chance of fulfilling their full potential.  
 
Education is essential to the inherent dignity of a person.302 In Makwanyane, the Constitutional 
Court held that “[r]ecognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of 
human beings [which are] entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.”303  I have 
shown above that education is essential to finding employment. Work is one of the most 
fundamental aspects in a person’s life, providing the individual with a means of financial support 
and, as importantly, a contributory role in society.304 A person’s employment is an essential 
component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being.305 Without the 
attainment of basic educational skills, a person is rendered powerless to assume control of his/her 
life. This manifests in a severe infringement of the inherent dignity of a person.    
                                                 
300 See note 264 above.  
301 Section 9 (1) of the Constitution provides: “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law.” 
302 Section 10 of the Constitution provides: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected.” 
303 Makwanyane (note 27 above) para 328. 
304 Hospersa obo Venter v SA Nursing Council (2006) 6 BLLR 558 (LC) para 27.  
305 As above.  
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In sum, the realization of the right to basic education is crucial to the fulfillment of the ideals of 
the transformative Constitution: it facilitates the enjoyment of all other rights in the Constitution, 
is key to the achievement of an individual’s full potential and enables the realization of a society 
built on the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
3.3 State obligations 
The South African Constitution obliges the state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfill the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.”306 In Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute 
Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 
1995 307, the court held: 
[The right to basic education]308 creates a positive right that basic education be provided for every 
person and not merely a negative right that such person should not be obstructed in pursuing his or her 
basic education.309 
Therefore, the state is not only prohibited from impairing access to the enjoyment of the right, 
but is obliged to take positive steps to ensure that basic education is provided. An understanding 
of the specific obligations engendered by the right to basic education requires an understanding 
of the scope and content of the right. However, to date, South African courts have not clarified 
the content and the concomitant legal obligations of section 29(1)(a).  
 
In its textual formulation, section 29(1)(a) differs from other socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution. The rights to have access to housing and health care services and the rights of 
                                                 
306 Section 7(2). See section 2.2.3.2.1 above for an explanation of the different types of obligations. 
307 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC) (School Education Bill case). (This case was decided under the 
Interim Constitution).  
308 Section 32(a) of the Interim Constitution.  
309 School Education Bill case (note 307 above) para 9.  
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access to food, water and social security310 are qualified to the extent that the second subsection 
of these rights states that “[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization” of each of these rights. The right to 
basic education is neither formulated as a right of access nor subject to the same internal 
qualifiers as sections 26 and 27.  
 
So far, claims have been made against the state for the enforcement of socio-economic rights in 
various cases before the Constitutional Court. In Grootboom311, the claimants sought access to 
housing, in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others312, access to 
health care services was claimed and in Khosa313, permanent residents sought to enforce access 
to social security. In determining whether government has fulfilled its obligations in respect of 
each of these rights, the Constitutional Court scrutinized the reasonableness of the government 
programme put in place to provide for the housing, health and social security needs of the 
claimants.314 The notion of reasonableness has become the standard against which the 
Constitutional Court assesses government’s compliance to meet its constitutional obligations in 
respect of qualified socio-economic rights. In Grootboom, the court held that “[i]n any challenge 
                                                 
310 Section 26 provides: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
  (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the   
progressive realisation of this right.” 
Section 27 provides: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-  
  (a) health care services, including reproductive health care;  
  (b) sufficient food and water; and  
  (c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social 
assistance.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights.” 
311 Note 18 above. 
312 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)(TAC).  
313 Note 274 above. 
314 Grootboom (note 18 above) para 41; TAC (note 312 above)  paras 67-68; Khosa (note 274 above) paras 44-67.  
 
 
 
 
 59
based on section 26 [or section 27] in which it is argued that the state has failed to meet the 
positive obligations imposed upon it by section 26(2)[or section 27(2)], the question will be 
whether the legislative and other measures taken by the state are reasonable.”315 In order to be 
reasonable, a government programme must display the following characteristics: 
• The programme must be comprehensive and co-ordinated with a clear delineation of 
responsibility amongst the various spheres of government, with national government 
having overarching responsibility; 
• The programme must be reasonable both in conception and implementation; 
• The programme must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for crises 
and for short, medium and long-term needs; 
• The programme cannot exclude a significant segment of society; 
• The programme must include a component which responds to the urgent needs of those in 
most desperate situations and the state must plan, budget and monitor measures to 
address immediate needs and the management of crises.316  
Whether the same standard of reasonableness applies to unqualified socio-economic rights, such 
as the right to basic education, still needs to be resolved by the court. As I will argue below, it 
seems as if the court is inclined to subject unqualified socio-economic rights to the same 
standard. Because of the unqualified nature of section 29(1)(a), it has been described as a 
“strong, positive right [which] means that in principal [this right] can be asserted regardless of 
the state’s other budgetary imperatives…”317 Moreover, it has been suggested that the 
unqualified nature of the right imposes a duty on the state to provide basic education without 
                                                 
315 Grootboom (note 18 above)  para 41.  
316 Liebenberg (note 13 above) 33-34.  
317 Note 284 above.  
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immediate delay.318 The argument seems to be that because section 29(1)(a) is not subject to 
“progressive realization” nor formulated to be reliant on the availability of state resources, the 
right should be realized immediately.319  However, it is my submission that the Constitutional 
Court will not agree. In Grootboom, the Court considered the right of children to shelter in terms 
of section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution.320 Similar to section 29(1)(a), this provision is 
unqualified. The respondents argued that the absence of internal qualifiers meant that children 
had a right to shelter on demand.321 The court’s response to this argument indicates a clear 
loyalty to “t]he carefully constructed constitutional scheme for progressive realization of socio-
economic rights [which] would make little sense if it could be trumped in every case by the 
rights of children to get shelter from the state on demand.”322 The court confirmed its contextual 
approach to interpretation by interpreting section 28(1)(c) in the context of the rights and 
obligations created by sections 25(5), 26 and 27 which are connected to the right to shelter.323 
Because the former rights are subject to internal qualifiers, the court’s point of view seems to be 
that a contextual interpretation of section 28(1)(c) results in this right being subject to the 
same.324 In TAC, the Court was once again presented with an opportunity to provide clarity on 
the unqualified nature of section 28(1)(c).325 This case dealt with the state’s policy to provide 
nevirapene, a drug thought to reduce HIV/AIDS transmission from mother to child during 
                                                 
318 S Liebenberg “Taking Stock: The jurisprudence on children’s socio-economic rights and its implication for 
government policy (2004) 5 ESR Review (5), 2. 
319 See section 2.2.3.2.1 (a) above.  
320 Note 18 above, para 70.  
Section 28(1) (c) provides: “Every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services.” 
321 Grootboom (note 18 above) para 72. 
322 As above,  para 71. 
323 As above, para 74.  
Section 25(5) provides: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.”    
324 Grootboom (note 18 above), para 74. 
325 Note 312 above, para 74. 
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childbirth.326 The respondents challenged the reasonableness of this policy because it was 
restricted to selected public hospitals.327 As a result those mothers without access to these 
hospitals would be denied an opportunity to be given nevirapene.328 In interpreting the child’s 
right to basic health care services under  section 28(1)(c), the court  conceded that “[t]he state is 
obliged to ensure that children are accorded the protection contemplated by section 28…”329 
However, it did not expressly state that this provision imposes a general direct duty on the state 
to provide basic health services to children.330 Sloth-Nielsen asserts that the Court’s “judgment 
was carefully worded and contextualized to avoid imposing general obligations on the state 
arising from entitlements on demand.”331 Thus, it was not clear whether the state’s obligation 
could be extended to other health conditions other than HIV/AIDS.332   Instead, the court 
evaluated section 28(1)(c) in terms of the established reasonableness standard. For instance, the 
needs of the children were described as “most urgent” and their rights as “most in peril” as a 
result of a “rigid and inflexible policy that excludes them from having access to nevirapene.”333 
In making these observations, the court was clearly considering two factors in determining 
whether the government policy was reasonable: firstly, it must be balanced and flexible and 
secondly, it must include a component which responds to the urgent needs of those in most 
desperate situations.334 In TAC, the Court thus failed to adequately address the unqualified nature 
of section 28(1)(c). By subjecting this right to the reasonableness review, the Constitutional 
                                                 
326 As above.  
327 As above, para 76.  
328 As above.  
329 As above, para 79.  
330 J Sloth-Nielsen and C Mbazira “Incy wincy spider went climbing up again-prospects for constitutional (re) 
interpretation of section 28(1) (c) of the South African Constitution in the next decade of democracy” (2007) 2 
Speculum Juris 47.  
331 As above. 
332 As above. 
333 Note 312 above, para 78.  
334 Note 13 above, 33-34. 
 
 
 
 
 62
Court gave the impression that there is no difference between the qualified and unqualified 
socio-economic rights. Therefore, based on the approach to interpretation in Grootboom and 
TAC, it seems logical that the Constitutional Court will interpret the right to basic education in 
“the context of the cluster of socio-economic rights in the Constitution.”335 The discussion above 
indicates that the right to basic education overlaps with most rights in the Constitution. Since the 
qualified rights are subject to internal qualifiers, the  court will be inclined to  use the 
reasonableness review to determine whether the state has fulfilled its obligations created by 
section 29(1)(a).  
 
3.3.1 A revised standard of reasonableness: higher degree of judicial scrutiny in respect of 
the right to basic education 
Although I have indicated above that it seems that the Court does not differentiate between the 
qualified and unqualified socio-economic rights, the difference in textual formulation between 
the two sets of rights needs to be further scrutinized. The absence of internal qualifiers in respect 
of section 29(1)(a) suggests that the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, when adopting this 
right, was to confer on it a higher normative status than the qualified rights.336 As a result, it has 
been argued that the right to basic education has to be subject to a higher standard of review than 
the established standard of reasonableness.337 Sachs J asserts that “a higher degree of judicial 
scrutiny is required for [unqualified] rights, including the right to basic education.”338  Veriava 
argues that a higher degree of judicial review requires that the state implement programmes that 
                                                 
335 Grootboom (note 18 above) para 19.  
336 Comment on the Department of Education’s Report to the Minister: A review of the financing, resourcing and 
costs of education in public schools, Law and Transformation Programme, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 
University of the Witwatersrand (30 April 2003).  
337 Veriava and Coomans (note 1 above) 62.  
338 A Sachs “Reflections on Emerging Themes” (1999) 1 ESR Review 14.  
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will give effect to section 29(1)(a) “as a matter of absolute priority.”339 This would require the 
prioritization of these programmes in budgetary allocations over the state’s other programmes.340 
Her views are endorsed by other leading commentators on children’s rights, such as 
Liebenberg.341 However, there are conflicting views on the content of this higher standard of 
review in respect of the unqualified socio-economic rights. Creamer suggests that the current 
reasonableness review standard should be supplemented by additional factors, including 
“accelerated and comprehensive service delivery to children in need.”342 Sloth- Nielsen rejects 
Creamer’s proposed higher standard of review.343 Her main point of contention is that there is no 
clear benchmark against which to measure the accelerated delivery of children’s rights.344 I have 
stated above that it is unlikely that the Constitutional Court will abandon the reasonableness 
review standard in respect of the right to basic education. However, I will argue below that there 
are two factors that require the Court to heighten the current reasonableness standard in respect 
of the right to basic education: (a) the state’s obligations should be derived from the content of 
the right and (b) the Court should ascertain the extent of the impact of the denial of the right on 
the complainant group.  
 
(a) Minimum core obligations   
Although some commentators are of the opinion that the minimum core argument has been dealt 
a “final blow” by the Constitutional Court345, I will argue below that this is not the case.  Despite 
rejecting the notion of the minimum core in Grootboom, the Court did not rule out the possibility 
                                                 
339 Veriava and Coomans (note 1 above) 62.  
340 As above.  
341 Sloth – Nielsen and Mbazira (note 330 above).  
342 As above.  
343 As above.  
344 As above.  
345 As above.  
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that “[t]here may be cases where it may be…appropriate to have regard to the content of a 
minimum core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the state are 
reasonable.”346 This indicates that in some instances, the Court will consider the minimum core 
obligations of a right as an additional factor in determining the reasonableness of the state’s 
conduct.  These factors are not a closed list.347 In Khosa, the court confirmed that “all relevant 
factors” have to be considered in “determining whether the state has complied with its 
constitutional standard of reasonableness.”348 The relevance of these factors “may vary from case 
to case depending on the particular facts and circumstances.”349  As I will argue below, the 
minimum core content of the right to education can be regarded as a relevant factor in assessing 
the reasonableness of the state’s action in realizing this right.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the school funding system on the right to 
basic education. The factors listed above in respect of the reasonableness review are desirable 
characteristics of a state policy.350 However, by examining only these factors in determining the 
reasonableness of the relevant state policies, the full impact of the funding system on the right 
will not be understood. I have shown in the previous chapter that South Africa has a key 
international obligation to provide free basic education to its learners.351 “Free” and 
“compulsory” are the two core elements of basic education.352 A reasonableness review devoid 
of the content of the right to basic education will not be sufficient to determine what is exactly 
meant by these concepts. Furthermore, the impact of the funding policy on the standard of 
                                                 
346 Note 18 above, para 33.  
347 Note 274 above, para 44.  
348 As above.  
349 As above.  
350 D Bilchitz “Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: laying the foundations for future socio-
economic jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 9.  
351 See section 2.2.3.2.2 above.  
352 As above.  
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education cannot be determined without understanding the content of the right first. In terms of 
the international standard, a basic education has to comply with the standard of adequacy.353 The 
standard of basic education can therefore not be measured without giving content to the right.  In 
Grootboom, the court rejected a minimum core approach in terms of the right of access to 
housing due to the varied needs in the context of housing: “there are those who need land; others 
need both land and houses; yet others need financial assistance.”354 As a result, the Court argued 
that the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of the right will be hard to define and it will 
be very difficult to decide “whether the minimum core obligation should be defined generally or 
with regard to specific groups of people.”355 The Court’s reasoning also established that defining 
the minimum core content is only possible “in so far as a country-specific core is capable of 
being ascertained.”356 The court further pointed out that in cases where it is appropriate to define 
the minimum core content, “sufficient information” needed to be placed before the court to make 
such a determination.357 It is submitted that the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of the 
right to basic education are the same for all learners entitled to it.358 Learners in South Africa 
may come from different socio-economic backgrounds but as learners in the same public school 
domain and as equal bearers of their constitutional right to basic education they are all entitled to 
the same type and quality of education. Defining the content of basic education is thus possible 
in a South African context since the objectives in meeting the basic learning needs are the same 
for all South African learners and the necessary information are available to provide guidance as 
to the content of the right.  The 4-A scheme had been accepted in terms of international law as 
                                                 
353 See section 2.2.3.1.3 above.  
354 Note 18 above, para 32.  
355 As above.  
356 As above, paras 32-33. See also Veriava and Coomans (note 1 above) 65.  
357 Note 18 above, para 32.  
358 Note 284 above, 18.  
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the most comprehensive framework in which to define the content of the right to basic education. 
At local level, this scheme had been endorsed by the South African Human Rights Commission 
and is cited with approval by the leading commentators on the right to education.359  The 
Department of Education, through the adoption of its  National Plan of Action and other policies 
have borrowed from the 4A Scheme to give content to section 29(1)(a).360  For the reasons 
indicated above, I submit that the Constitutional Court, in assessing the impact of the school 
funding system on section 29(1)(a), will be compelled to determine the content of this right.  
 
(b) The impact of the denial of the right to basic education on the complainant group: the 
case of Khosa361 
In Khosa, the applicants challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Social 
Assistance Act.362 The applicants who enjoyed permanent residence status of South Africa, 
argued that their exclusion from the country’s social security scheme was in violation of the 
state’s obligations under section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution.363 They also contended that the 
exclusion constituted unfair discrimination against them in terms of section 9(3) of the 
Constitution and was unjustifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.364  
Section 9 of the Constitution provides: 
"(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
                                                 
359 See notes 1, 4 above.  
360 See note 63 above, 37.  
361 Note 274 above.  
362 59 of 1992. As above, para 1.  
363 As above, para 38.  
364 As above, para 39.  
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grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair."  
 
In determining the constitutionality of the stated provisions, Mokgoro J examined the 
reasonableness of the exclusion of the applicants from the state’s social assistance scheme.365 In 
assessing the reasonableness of the scheme, she, inter alia, examined “the impact of the 
exclusion on permanent residents…[including the effect it has] on other intersecting rights.”366 
She held that “…where the right to social assistance is conferred by the Constitution on 
“everyone” and permanent residents are denied access to this right, the equality rights entrenched 
in section 9 are directly implicated."367  Mokgoro J argued that it is necessary that the state 
differentiates between certain categories of people in order “to allocate rights, duties, 
immunities, privileges, benefits or even disadvantages and to provide efficient and effective 
delivery of social services.”368 However, she held further that these “classifications must meet 
the constitutional standard of reasonableness.”369 At para 53, she states: 
In this case, the state has chosen to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens.  That 
differentiation, if it is to pass constitutional muster, must not be arbitrary or irrational nor must it 
manifest a naked preference.  There must be a rational connection between that differentiating law 
and the legitimate government purpose it is designed to achieve.  A differentiating law or action 
which does not meet these standards will be in violation of section 9(1) and section 27(2) of the 
Constitution. 
                                                 
365 As above, paras 48-49.  
366 As above, para 49.  
367 As above.  
368 As above, para 53.  
369 As above.  
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Mokgoro J conceded that there was indeed a rational connection between the differentiating law 
and a legitimate government purpose.370 This proved that the differentiating law met the standard 
of rationality as provided for in section 9(1). However, the test for determining constitutionality 
under the Constitution is not rationality, but reasonableness.371 In determining the reasonableness 
of the state's measures to provide social assistance to the applicants, Mokgoro J proceeded to 
determine whether the exclusion of the applicants constituted unfair discrimination under section 
9(3) of the Constitution.372 The Constitutional Court has adopted a test to determine unfair 
discrimination which supports the notion of substantive equality endorsed by the Constitution.373 
This enquiry, established in the case of Harksen v Lane374 provides as follows: 
 
(a) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to discrimination? If it is on a specified ground [in 
section 9(3)], then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then 
whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based 
on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity 
of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.  
 (ii) If the differentiation amounts to discrimination, does it amount to unfair discrimination? If it 
has been found to have been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an 
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of 
unfairness focus primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his 
                                                 
370 As above, para 67.  
371 As above.  
372 As above, para 68.  
373 The South African Constitution endorses a substantive approach to equality which transcends mere formal 
equality which requires that the law treats people the same irrespective of their starting point in life. By supporting a 
substantive notion of equality, the Constitutional Court acknowledges that “besides uneven race, class and gender 
attributes of our society, there are other levels and forms of social differentiation and systematic under – privilege, 
which still persist.” See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) and Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 
(CC); 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC) para 26.  
374 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) (Harksen).  
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or her situation.375 
 
The Court has distinguished the following factors in determining unfair discrimination: 
 
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the past from 
patterns of disadvantage;  
(b) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it. If its purpose 
is manifestly not directed, in the first instance, at impairing the complainants in the manner 
indicated above, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal, such as, for 
example, the furthering of equality for all, this purpose may, depending on the facts of the 
particular case, have a significant bearing on the question whether complainants have in fact 
suffered the impairment in question. . . .  
(c) with due regard to (a) and (b) above, and any other relevant factors, the extent to which the 
discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and whether it has led to an 
impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably 
serious nature.”376 
 
The Constitution only prohibits unfair discrimination.377 Unfair discrimination “principally 
means treating people differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human 
beings, who are inherently equal in dignity.”378 Dignity is therefore of fundamental 
importance in understanding unfair discrimination.379 Unfair discrimination amounts to 
differential treatment that is hurtful and demeaning.380 It takes place when “law or conduct, 
for no good reason treats some people as inferior or incapable or less deserving of respect 
than others.”381 It also takes place “when law or conduct perpetuates or does nothing to 
                                                 
375 I Curie and J De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law, Volume 1 (2001) 349-350.  
376 Harksen (note 374 above) para 53.  
377 Section 9(3).  
378 Prinsloo v Van Der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) para 31.  
379 Note 375 above, 244.  
380 As above.  
381 As above.  
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remedy existing patterns of disadvantage.”382 
 
In President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo383 Goldstone J stated that:  
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our 
new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings 
will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.  
The achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, 
but that that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.  
 
In Khosa, Mokgoro J found that the applicants form part of a vulnerable group that are worthy of 
constitutional protection.384 She held that because permanent residents also contribute to the 
welfare system through the payment of taxes but were nevertheless excluded from claiming 
social assistance, the impression was created that they "are in some way inferior to citizens and 
less worthy of social assistance."385  She found that “decisions about the allocation of public 
benefits represent the extent to which poor people are treated as equal members of society.”386 
This suggests that if vulnerable groups are excluded from public benefits to which they are 
entitled to, they are not treated as equal members of society. In assessing the impact of the denial 
of social assistance on the applicants, Mokgoro J held that their exclusion from social welfare 
benefits casts them in the role of supplicants to the extent that they have to depend on friends, 
family and their community [for survival]. As a result, their dignity is gravely infringed.387 Their 
exclusion from social assistance was also found to deprive them of their ability to enjoy the other 
constitutional rights vested in them.388 In sum, it was held that the denial of the right to social 
                                                 
382 As above.  
383 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) paras 41-43.  
384 Note 274 above, para 74.  
385 As above.  
386 As above.  
387 As above, para 76.  
388 As above, para 77.  
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security affected the applicants "in a most fundamental way".389 Hence, this denial was found to 
constitute unfair discrimination against the applicants.390 Thus, where a vulnerable group is 
excluded from benefits derived from a socio-economic right and that exclusion has a grave 
impact on their dignity and leads to a denial of their other constitutional rights, unfair 
discrimination is established. A further consideration is Mokgoro J's view that “the importance 
of providing access to social assistance to all who live permanently in South Africa and the 
impact upon life and dignity that a denial of such access has, far outweighs the financial and 
immigration considerations on which the state relies."391 This implies that the importance 
attached to a socio-economic right and the effect of its exclusion on the dignity and life of a 
group will determine the extent to which a state can rely on financial and other considerations as 
justification for not complying with the realization of the right. It is submitted that the more 
important the right and the more grave the infringement on dignity and life of the group seeking 
realization of the right, the more difficult it will be for the state to claim that it cannot realize the 
right because of a lack of resources. This is particularly true in the context of vulnerable groups 
who are much more prone to have their dignity infringed and other constitutional rights denied if 
they are excluded from the enjoyment of benefits derived from the realization of socio-economic 
rights. In line with the notion of the minimum core, states will thus have to prove that they could 
not realize the right because of circumstances beyond their control or that they could not secure 
the assistance of the international community.392 The state’s burden in proving that they could 
not meet the minimum core obligations of a right is thus very arduous.393 Lastly, Mokgoro J held 
that "the denial of access to social grants to permanent residents who, but for their citizenship, 
                                                 
389 As above.  
390 As above.  
391 As above, para 82.  
392 See note 205 above.  
393 The exact nature of this evidentiary burden will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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would qualify for such assistance does not constitute a reasonable legislative measure as 
contemplated by section 27(2) of the Constitution."394 This suggests that where there is a lack of 
equal access to benefits derived from a socio-economic right, it is more likely that there will be 
an infringement of the right.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
394 Note 274 above, para 82.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEM 
4. Introduction  
This chapter is the crux of the study. Here, I assess the constitutional validity of the school 
funding system by examining the impact thereof on the right to basic education of black and/or 
poor learners. However, before embarking on this enquiry, it is imperative that I clarify the 
present legislative framework governing the funding of basic education.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
4.1 The legislative framework governing the funding of public schools 
In terms of Schedule 4 of the Constitution, education is a matter of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence. Thus, both the national parliament and the various provincial 
legislatures have the power to pass laws on education.395 The Ministry of Education determines 
national policy that governs all schools in South Africa.396 However, provincial education 
authorities bear the primary responsibility for public schools.397  The funding of public schools is 
determined by provincial budgets in compliance with national standards.398 Since 1994, 
significant legislative and policy reform has taken place to address the historical disparity in the 
education system. Various laws, regulations and policies have been implemented to this effect. 
The South African Schools Act (Schools Act)399 as amended by the Education Laws 
Amendment Act400, the National Norms and Standards for School Funding (Norms and 
                                                 
395 A conflict of laws between national parliament and a provincial legislature is resolved in terms of section 146 of 
the Constitution.  
396 National survey on barriers of access to education in South Africa: Baseline review and conceptual framework 
document (Barriers survey) (September 2006), prepared jointly by Social Surveys and the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 22. 
397 B Barry Schools and the Law: A Participant’s Guide (2006) 23.  
398 As above, 23. 
399 84 of 1996. 
400 24 of 2005.  
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Standards)401 and the Employment of Educators Act402 together with the Regulations for the 
Creation of Educator Posts in a Provincial Department of Education and the Distribution 
of Such Posts to the Educational Institutions of such a Department403 govern the funding of 
public schools in South Africa. The Schools Act instructs government to fund public schools 
from public revenue to ensure the redress of the inequalities in the education system.404 The 
Norms and Standards clarify the procedures to ensure the redress contemplated by the Schools 
Act.405 Lastly, the Employment of Educators Act read with its relevant regulations outlines a 
post-provisioning model which aims to re-deploy well qualified teachers to the previously 
disadvantaged schools.406 
 
4.1.1 Categories of funding 
State funding is divided into three categories.407 Firstly, the bulk of funding (approximately 90 
percent) is spent on teachers’ salaries, the exact amount of which is connected to the 
qualifications and experience of the teachers.408 Since most suitably qualified teachers are at 
historically advantaged schools, the lion’s share of the state’s budget is allocated to these 
schools.409 The Department has attempted to re-deploy well qualified teachers to the 
disadvantaged schools by instructing provincial departments to allocate between two and five 
                                                 
401 Government Gazette 19347: General Notice 2362 as amended by South African Schools Act: Amended National 
Norms and Standards for School Funding (Government Gazette 29179, General Notice 869). 
402 76 of 1998.  
403 Government Gazette 19627: Government Notice R1676 as amended by Government Gazette 24077: Government 
Notice R1451.  
404 Section 34-36 as amended by the Education Laws Amendment Act. See also Preamble to the Schools Act. 
405 Note 401 above, paras 1-3. 
406 Veriava (note 114 above) 4.  
407 Note 401 above, 24. 
408 As above.  
409 As above. 
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percent of these posts to poor schools.410 However, it is doubtful whether this decision has had 
any significant effect on the difference in personnel funding between the public schools. Most 
provinces have only set aside two percent of their posts for the redistribution.411 Moreover, the 
South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU) suggests that the formula governing the 
selection of schools to benefit from this re-deployment is not favouring the poor schools.412 In 
addition, it is submitted that the transformation of the disadvantaged schools into learning centres 
which are equal to their former Model C counterparts will require a far more robust policy from 
government than the current redistribution model.  The second category of state funding is 
directed at the infrastructure of schools.413 Since most disadvantaged schools are in a deplorable 
physical condition414, government allocates money for infrastructure almost exclusively to poor 
schools.415 The last category is the non-personnel, non-capital expenditure (NPNC) or more 
commonly known as “school allocation” money.416 This expenditure is directed at the purchasing 
of capital equipment and consumables necessary for teaching and assessment in schools, 
including textbooks, stationary, furniture, computers, photocopiers, teaching aids, electricity, 
water, and so forth.417 Schools pay for these from their NPNC expenditure and from money 
produced by charging school fees 418 and organizing fund raising activities.419  
                                                 
410 As above.  
411 As above.  
412 As above.  In terms of this formula, learners are “weighted” according to factors such as “class size, the range of 
subjects offered, whether the school caters for disabled children, the number of different language streams in a 
school and the level of poverty in the community served by the school.” The higher the total weighting of the 
learners in a school, the more likely it is that the school will benefit from the re-deployment of teachers’ posts. 
According to SADTU, the more advantaged schools are benefited by this formula since the level of poverty can be 
outweighed by the other factors from the formula.  
413 Note 396 above, 24.  
414 See note 288 above.  
415 Note 396 above, 25.  
416 As above. 
417 As above, 25-26. 
418 Section 39 (1) of SASA provides:  
“School fees may be determined and charged at a public school only if a resolution to do so has been adopted by a 
majority of parents attending” the annual budget meeting of the school.  
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4.1.2 National quintiles and “no fee” schools 
 The state funding allocated to schools is governed by the Norms and Standards in terms of 
which schools are divided into national quintiles ranging from the poorest school to the least 
poor school.420  The provincial departments are instructed by national government to allocate a 
specified amount per learner according to the quintile in which the leaner is based.421 For 
example, in 2008, schools in quintile one (poorest schools) received an allocation of R775 per 
learner and in quintile 5 (least poor schools) an amount of R129 per learner.422 An adequacy 
benchmark is also determined nationally, which is considered as “the minimally adequate 
amount for a learner’s right to basic education to be realized.423 The adequacy benchmark for 
2008 was R581.424 Schools that receive this amount or in excess thereof are declared “no fee” 
schools.425 However,   if a “no fee” school receives less than the adequacy benchmark, it may 
charge school fees to make up for the shortfall in state funding.426 The Department points out 
that “should the funding of no fee schools for some reason not reach the no fee threshold level, it 
                                                                                                                                                             
419 Note 396 above, 25. 
420 Note 401 above, para 109. 
421 Note 396 above, 30.  
422 Note 401 above, para 109.  
 According to the Norms and Standards, schools in quintile 2 receive R711 per learner, schools in quintile 3, R581 
per learner and schools in quintile 4, R388 per learner for the year 2008.  
According to para 101 of the Norms and Standards, the provincial education departments must assign to each school 
a poverty score that will enable them to sort schools from poorest to least poor. The determination of this score is 
based on the relative poverty of the community around the school, which in turn depends on the individual or 
household advantage or disadvantage  with regard to income, wealth and/or level of education. The poverty score 
should be based on data collected from the national Census conducted by Statistics South Africa. Provincial 
departments are prohibited from relying on data provided by schools themselves.  
423 Note 396 above, 30. 
424 Note 401 above,  para 109.   
In terms of para 91 of the Norms and Standards, in assessing the level of allocation to schools, government considers 
the following  key factors , namely the “rights of learners with regards to schooling”, “the minimum basic package 
of school inputs” required to satisfy “quality education”, the costs of services and goods needed by schools, the 
“distribution of income and poverty in the country”, the “greater ability of certain communities to make private 
contributions to the schooling process” and the overall budget of government.  
425 As above, para 156. Thus, schools in quintile 1, 2 and 3 are no-fee schools.   
426 Section 37 (11) of the Schools Act as amended by the Education Laws Amendment Act.  
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would be important for parents to have a way of dealing with this contingency.”427 It is submitted 
that this provision defeats the whole purpose of exempting parents from payment of school fees 
in the poorest quintiles, especially in light of government’s declaration that it “believes that in 
schools serving the poorest communities, there should be no school fees.”428 A further concern is 
that schools may receive the adequacy benchmark or in excess thereof, but this may not be 
enough to cater for all of their expenditure needs. The Education Department receives regular 
complaints from no-fee schools claiming that they have less income since their declaration as no-
fee schools.429 This may explain the practice of the latter schools to continue charging school 
fees, despite their status as “no-fee” schools.430  
 
4.1.3 Schools charging school fees 
Schools receiving less than the adequacy benchmark may charge school fees.431 Section 39 of the 
Schools Act provides:  
(1) School fees may be determined and charged at a public school only if a resolution to do so has 
been adopted by a majority of parents attending” the annual budget meeting of the school.  
(2) [This resolution] must provide for : 
 (a) the amount of fees to be charged; and 
 (b) equitable criteria and procedures for the total, partial or conditional exemption of parents  
      who are unable to pay school fees. 
Firstly, it is noted that parents have the discretion to determine whether school fees will be 
charged and the amount to be charged. Government explains the reasoning behind the levying of 
school fees and making it subject to the discretion of parents as follows: 
 
                                                 
427 Note 401 above, para 163.  
428 As above , para 153.  
429 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-06-01-free-education-in-sharp-focus [accessed 1 July 2008].  
430 http://www.kzneducation.gov.za/news/2007/21-01-2007b.pdf [accessed 1 July 2008].  
431 Note 401 above, para 156.  
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The [Schools Act] imposes a responsibility on all public school governing bodies432 to do their utmost 
to improve the quality of education in their schools by raising additional resources to supplement those 
which the state provides from public funds (section 36). All parents, but particularly those who are less 
poor or who have good incomes, are thereby encouraged to increase their own direct financial and 
other contributions to the quality of their children’s education in public schools. The Act does not 
interfere unreasonably with parents’ discretion under the law as to how to spend their own resources on 
their children’s education.433 
 
This statement acknowledges that the state is aware that its own funding towards schools may 
not be enough to provide for a quality education. Therefore, parents’ contributions through 
school fees or fund raising activities should make up for a shortfall in state funding. It is 
submitted that this declaration illustrates the state’s shortsightedness into the existing inequality 
in the education system.  Given the discretion of parents, the amount of school fees to be charged 
depends on the economic status of the parent community the school serves. Thus, the more 
affluent the parent community, the higher the school fees that will be charged and vice versa. 
Although poor schools may receive a larger amount in school allocations than the more 
advantaged schools, the parent communities serving the former schools   are not financially able 
to increase the amount of fees charged if there is a shortfall in the state funding. However, 
schools serving affluent communities are in a position to increase their budgets despite receiving 
a lesser allocation from government.434 The link between inequality and school fees is best 
revealed by the fact that more money enters the education system through school fees than 
through the allocations by provincial education departments.435 Thus, for example in 2001, the 
national school allocation from government flowing into the education system amounted to R1,5 
                                                 
432 The school governing bodies exercise various functions at a school, including administering and allocating school 
fees. See sections 16-21 of the Schools Act. 
433 Note 401 above, para 41.  
434 Note 396 above, 26. 
435 As above, 26-27. 
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billion.436 In 2002, school fees constituted at least R3,5 billion.437 Approximately 90 percent of 
school fees are charged by the richest 20 percent of schools.438 Only 0.9 percent of school fees 
reaches the poorest 20 percent of schools.439 The following table compiled by Idasa440 shows that 
despite government’s policies of redress in education, the existing inequality in the education 
system is perpetuated by the present school fee system: 
 
BUDGETS IN RICH AND POOR SCHOOLS 
 Funding Source ‘Poor School’ ‘Rich School’ 
School allocation R196 000 R28 000 
Teacher salaries (30 teachers @ R60 
000) 
R180 000 R180 000 
School fees  R50 000 R2 500 000 
TOTAL BUDGET R 426 000 R2 708 000 
 
Idasa based the study above on a hypothetical “poor and rich school” having the same amount of 
learners and teachers (1000 learners and 30 teachers).441 It assumes that the poor school is 
charging its learners R50 annually in school fees whereas the rich school is charging R2500 
annually per learner.442 The results of the study shows that despite the lesser contribution of 
government to school allocation, the rich school has a budget more than twice the size of the 
poor school because of the vast difference in the amount of school fees charged.  
 
 
                                                 
436 As above, 27. 
437 As above. 
438 As above. 
439 As above. 
440 Institute for a Democratic South Africa.  
441 The study perfomed by Idasa  is accessible from  Idasa Budget Information Service The Intergovernment Fiscal 
Review – Education (November 1999).  
442 As above.  
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4.1.3.1 The School Fee Exemption Policy 
The legislature acknowledges that some parents may not be able to afford school fees. Therefore, 
provision is made for the automatic, full, partial or conditional exemption of school fees.443 Until 
2005, before amendments to the Schools Act, parents qualified for a full exemption if they 
earned less than ten times the annual school fees.444 Parents qualified for partial exemptions if 
they earned between ten and thirty times the annual school fees.445 Currently, the different forms 
of exemptions are calculated according to an extremely intricate formula which looks like this:  
[(E=F + T + fyo)]  
[-----------------] / [I] > [10%]  
[ (Y + yo) ]446 
                                                 
443 South African Schools Act: Regulations Related to the Exemptions of Parents from Payment of School Fees in 
Public Schools (Government Gazette 29311:Government Notice 1052) (Exemption Regulations), para 5.   
444 Note 396 above, 28. 
445 As above.  
446 Note 443 above, para 6(2).  
E = per learner expenditure by parent in a school; F = annual school fees charged to any parent in the school; T = 
additional monetary contributions explicitly demanded by the school; f = the lowest of the  three values; (1) the 
adequacy benchmark for the current yr (2) the average fee charged to the parent in the school (3) the average 
nondiscounted annual fees charges in other schools; yo = the number of learners in other schools; Y = the number of 
learners for which a parent is charged annual school fees in the current school; I = combined gross income of 
parents; 10% is of the gross income used towards education expenditure.  
Phillip Tucker from the Centre of Applied Legal Studies at 
http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:nEsBs2QRXwkJ:web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/E0357D9D-1DDA-4DDC-
87BA-
5BBEBAD4809A/0/SchoolfeesarticleinDeRebusPhillipaTucker.pdf+amended+exemption+regulations&hl=en&ct=c
lnk&cd=7&gl=za [accessed 7 November 2008]  explains the formula as it pertains to full and partial exemptions as  
follows:  
“If the annual school fees (including any extra expenses such as a school trip or any extra uniforms, for example, 
sports uniforms) are 10% or more of the total gross annual income (including salaries, investments and any business 
profits for both parents, if a two-parent household) a parent is entitled to a full exemption and will not have to pay 
school fees. If the school fees are between 3,5% and 10% of his total income a parent will qualify for a partial 
exemption. If the school fees are 2,5% of a parent’s total income, the parent does not qualify for any exemption, 
unless he has three or more children at the same public school or at another public school that has not been declared 
a ‘no-fee’ school. If the school fees are 3% of a parent’s total income, the parent does not qualify for any 
exemption, unless he has two or more children at the same public school or at another public school that has not 
been declared a ‘no-fee’ school. Note that, when a parent has children in different schools or more than one child at 
the same school, the amount of school fees that the parent has to pay in respect of each child must be calculated 
individually. This must be done by applying the same formula and using the highest amount of school fees at each 
particular school. “ 
According to  para 1 of the Exemption Regulations, a conditional exemption may be “granted to a parent who 
qualifies for a partial exemption, but owing to personal circumstances beyond his or her control, cannot even pay the 
reduced amount.” A conditional exemption may also be granted to a parent who does not qualify for an exemption 
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The principal is obliged to inform parents of the procedures for applying for an exemption from 
school fees.447 Parents are also entitled to a copy of the regulations governing the exemption of 
school fees which must be displayed at a conspicuous place at the school.448 The status of parents 
who apply for exemptions must be kept confidential by the school.449An educator or similar 
person at a school is obliged to assist parents who require assistance in applying for an 
exemption.450 Where such assistance is not available, the principal must assist the parents.451 In 
light of this complex formula which has been described as “ridiculously convoluted”, it is likely 
that most parents will rely on the schools to assist them in applying for exemptions. In Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies and Others v Hunt Road Secondary School and Others, the court “ordered 
that the Hunt Road Secondary School was interdicted against proceeding with any debt-recovery 
actions instituted against parents for unpaid fees since January the previous year (2006), unless it 
could prove that the parents did not qualify for school-fee exemptions in terms of the Schools 
Act.”452  Despite this landmark decision, the “general trend” in many schools is not to enforce 
the exemptions policy.453 The main reason for non-enforcement seems to be that the state does 
not grant compensation to schools that do grant exemptions.454 As indicated by the National Plan 
of Action “[t]he school allocations flowing to quintile 5 (richest schools) are intended to make it 
possible and fair for these schools to enrol poor learners to a level where 25% of learners would 
                                                                                                                                                             
“but supplies information [to the school governing body] indicating his or her inability to pay school fees owing to 
personal circumstances beyond his or her control.” The Automatic exemptions are available to a person who has the 
responsibility of a parent in respect of a child placed in a foster home, a youth care centre, a place of safety or an 
orphanage; a person who is a kinship caregiver of an orphan or of a child who has been abandoned by his or her 
parents and is without any visible means of support; a person who receives a social grant on behalf of a child or a 
child who heads a household.   
447 Note 443 above, para 3(1)(a). 
448 As above, paras 3(2) and (3).  
449 As above, para 3(4).  
450 As above, para 9(1). 
451 As above, para 9(2).  
452 Unreported Case 10091/2006, Kwazulu-Natal High Court. See also note 446 above and Veriava (note 114 above) 
16. 
453 Veriava (note 114 above) 8.  
454 As above, 7. 
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be granted full exemption from school fees.”455 This implies that the purpose of the allocation is 
to reimburse the school for exempting 25% of its learners from school fees. However, the 
relevant legislation does not give effect to this by expressly ordering the state to subsidize 
schools which exempt learners from school fees.456 Moreover, if one considers the current 
allocations to quintile 5, it is probable that the allocation from the state will be far less than what 
the school would have collected in terms of school fees. A second reason for non-enforcement is 
that in many cases, schools do not even have exemption policies in place.457 Many parents are 
not even aware of such a right to apply for an exemption from school fees.458 This implies that 
many schools are disregarding the law by not taking the necessary steps to provide the required 
information to parents to enable them to enforce their rights under the Exemption policy. Fiske 
and Ladd studied fee exemption patterns in South Africa and established that only 2.5% of 
parents with children in primary schools are granted exemptions.459 At secondary school, 3.7 of 
parents receive exemptions.460 A final reason for the poor enforcement of the exemption policy is 
that the law does not impose any sanctions on schools which fail to adopt exemption policies.461  
 
4.2 The constitutionality of the school funding system 
I will argue below that the school funding system is unconstitutional because the exclusion of 
black and/or poor learners from equally benefitting under the latter system is unreasonable. In 
line with Khosa, I will contend that the funding system unfairly discriminates against these 
learners on the basis of race and/or socio-economic status. As a result, it is unreasonable and thus 
                                                 
455 Note 77 above, para 41. 
456 Note 114 above, 7. 
457 As above, 8.  
458 As above. 
459 EB Fiske and HF Ladd “Balancing public and private resources for basic education: school fees in post-apartheid 
South Africa” in L Chisholm (ed) Changing Class Education in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2004) 72-74.  
460 As above. 
461 Veriava (note 114 above) 8.  
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infringes section 29(1)(a) and section 9 of the Constitution. In order to determine which benefits 
learners are entitled to, it is imperative to clarify the obligations engendered by the right to basic 
education, which I have sufficiently dealt with in the previous chapters. This is in accordance 
with my proposed heightened standard of reasonableness review which requires courts to 
examine the content of the right as well as the impact of the denial of the right on black and/or 
poor learners.  
 
4.2.1 Does the school funding system unfairly discriminate against black and/or poor 
learners? 
Section 9 (3) of the Constitution provides: 
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
 
Section 5(1) of the Schools Act provides: 
A public school must admit learners and serve their educational requirements without unfairly 
discriminating in any way. 
 
Section 5(3) of the Schools Act provides: 
No learner may be refused admission to a public school on the grounds that his or her parent is 
unable to pay or has not paid the school fees determined by the governing body under section 39. 
 
In terms of the Harksen enquiry462, there is no violation of section 9(1) of the Constitution 
because the school fee system is rationally connected to legitimate government purposes. The 
Education Department has noted that school fees serve the following objectives: 
                                                 
462 See 68 above.  
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(a) It provides a mechanism to government to raise revenue from parents who are economically 
able to make such a contribution, “which in turn provides fiscal space for the state to implement 
preferential funding for poor schools. 
(b) It encourages parents to participate in the governance of schools; and  
(c) It promotes accountability of schools to the parent communities.”463 
These purposes in my view constitute legitimate government purposes. I will now proceed to 
determine whether there is a violation of section 9(3), firstly on account of race and secondly on 
account of economic status.  
 
(i) Race 
According to a study by Fiske and Ladd, with some exceptions, race is still one of the 
determining factors of the choice of school a learner attends.464 The study reveals that most 
learners attend the schools that they were compelled to attend in the past on account of their 
race.465 Because of former Apartheid laws466, the geographical location of the school is closely 
linked to the wealth of the community.467 Thus, former black schools are located in 
predominantly impoverished communities whereas former white schools are located in 
overwhelmingly rich communities.468 Because the state allocations to a school is determined by 
                                                 
463 Note 401above, para 152. 
464 EB Fiske & HF Ladd ‘Financing Schools in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Initial Steps Toward Fiscal Equity’ 
(prepared for International Conference on Education and Decentralisation: African Experiences and Comparative 
Analysis, Johannesburg, 10-14 June 2002) in Roithmayr (note 6 above). 
465 As above. Fiske and Ladd found that 79% of black learners remained in the former DET schools, 94% of former 
coloured learners remain in the former HOR schools and primarily 100% of white learners remain in the former 
HOA schools.  
466 In City Council of Pretoria  v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC)  Langa J remarked at para 
32: 
“The effect of apartheid laws was that race and geography were inextricably linked and the application of a 
geographical standard, although seemingly neutral, may in fact be racially discriminatory.”  
467 Note 464 above.  
468 As above.  
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the poverty of the community around the school469, it is evident that the former black schools 
will be located in the poorest quintiles whereas the former white schools will be located in the 
least poor quintiles. Because of the close correlation between race and geographical location, it is 
submitted that section 39 of the Schools Act indirectly differentiates between learners on the 
basis of race. Because race is a listed ground in section 9(3), indirect discrimination is 
established.  In Pretoria City Council v Walker, the Constitutional Court held that indirect 
discrimination occurs where “conduct may appear to be neutral” but the consequences thereof 
results in discrimination.470 Although section 39 of the Schools Act facially differentiates on the  
basis of geographical location (a seemingly neutral ground), the effect of the discretion given to 
parents is that black learners receive a far lesser contribution from their community in respect of 
school fees than their white counterparts on account of the poverty of the geographical location 
of the school.471  Whether the discrimination is unfair, depends on the following factors. Firstly, 
the position of black learners in our society has been well documented in this study.472 To 
reiterate, most of these learners are still attending schools lacking the most basic resources and 
qualified teachers because of the inequality in the funding regime of the Apartheid 
government.473 According to statistics provided by the Department of Education, 7 000 teachers 
in the public education system are under qualified or unqualified to teach.474 These teachers are 
almost exclusively in the previously disadvantaged schools.475 However, this figure could be 
much larger since the human resources system of the Department does not indicate the 
                                                 
469 Note 401 above, paras 87 -91. 
470 Note 466 above, para 32.  
471 I do take into account that there may be white learners in poor quintiles and black learners in the least poor 
quintiles. However, I am concerned here with establishing unfair discrimination against the overwhelming majority 
of black learners.  
472 See section 3.2.1 above.  
473 As above.  
474 Rapport, “SA werf wiskunde-, wetenskap-onnies in Egipte, Uganda” (31 May 2008). 
475 Note 396 above, 23.  
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qualifications of teachers.476 As indicated above, government’s attempt to re-deploy well 
qualified teachers to the poor schools has not been successful.477 As a result, these schools are 
left to cope without suitably qualified teachers because unlike rich schools they are not able to 
recruit additional teachers on governing body contracts, paying them from school fees.478  In 
contrast, most white learners are benefiting from the same system which guaranteed highly 
qualified teachers and manifested in former Model C schools which can boast with “state of the 
art computers, cutting edge laboratories and first rate textbooks.”479 Ironically, the democratic 
regime which aims to “redress past injustices in educational provision”480 is perpetuating the 
inequality in the current education system. Because of the discretion given to parents to 
determine school fees, former white schools can charge an amount of fees which enable them to 
maintain their position of privilege if government funding is not enough. On the face of it, the 
current state funding regime favours these schools with a higher allocation in NPNC expenditure. 
From these allocations, the poor schools have to pay their water and electricity costs as well as 
purchase textbooks, teaching aids and other capital equipment and consumables. In the event of a 
shortfall, these schools have to rely on school fees. However, considering the poor financial 
status of the parent community, poor schools “must just make do” if school fees are not enough 
to provide for all of their expenditures.481 The second factor to consider is the nature and purpose 
                                                 
476 Note 474 above.  
477 See section 4.1.1 above.  
478 Note 401 above, para 46. 
479 Note 6 above, 30.  
480 See Preamble to the Schools Act.  
481 In 2007, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) visited various schools in the Northern Cape as part of its 
Taking Parliament to the People Programme.The purpose of their visit was to identify barriers which hamper 
service delivery to schools. For purposes of this study, I will reveal their findings in respect of one no-fee school and 
one fee charging school. The no-fee school reported that the funding from government was not enough to purchase 
enough textbooks and other learner support material. Poor student performance at the school was attributed to a lack 
of study material. The fee charging school experienced similar problems. Learners were forced to share textbooks 
because of a lack of study material. Because of the poverty of the parent community, school fees were charged at 
only R120 a year. However, this was not enough to provide for the shortfall in state funding. For a detailed account 
 
 
 
 
 87
of section 39 of the Schools Act.  The objectives of section 39 are listed above. All these 
purposes serve important goals in society. However, they are not important enough to negate my 
finding that section 39 nevertheless amounts to unfair discrimination against black learners. This 
leads me to the third factor which investigates the impact of section 39 on black  learners. I have 
highlighted the vast difference in resources between former black and white schools above.  The 
discretion imposed on parents in terms of section 39 perpetuates this state of affairs. Where 
public funding is inadequate, the state expects black learners to “get by” on the limited resources 
available to them.  Moreover, because of the state’s failed policy to re-deploy well-qualified 
teachers to the former disadvantaged schools, black learners are deprived of the  same quality of 
teaching as is found in former white schools. Black schools do not have the financial capacity to 
employ additional teachers from a healthy school budget as is the case with former white 
schools.  The impact of section 39 results in a situation which conveys a message to black 
learners that they are inferior and not entitled to be educated under the same conditions and 
entitled to the same resources as their white counterparts. They are in effect being told that they 
are not entitled to the same respect and concern from government as white learners.  There is no 
doubt that the fundamental dignity of black learners is severely impaired.   
 
(ii) Socio - economic status 
Socio- economic status is not a ground listed in section 9 (3). Differentiation based on socio-
economic status will result in discrimination if the ground has the potential to impair a person’s 
dignity or other comparable interests.482 The Equality Act483 defines “socio –economic status” as 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the NCOP’s findings, see http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2008/comreports/080515ncopreport2.htm [accessed 7 
November 2008].  
 
482 Harksen (note 374 above), para 53. 
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“[including] a social or economic condition or perceived condition of a person who is 
disadvantaged by poverty, low employment status or low-level education qualifications.”484 
Thus, socio-economic status is inextricably linked to a level of poverty, in other words what is 
affordable to a person or not.  According to the Vienna Declaration485, the exclusion of people 
with a low socio-economic status from social services is an infringement of their inherent 
dignity.486 Thus, a person’s dignity is impaired where there is an inability to access social 
services. The Human Rights Commission reveals that many learners are denied access to basic 
education because of an inability to pay school fees.487  Differentiation on the ground of socio-
economic status is therefore obviously a ground which can potentially impair a person’s dignity. 
Discrimination is therefore established. In assessing unfair discrimination: Firstly, the position of 
the poor in our society is appalling. A recent report by the Presidency reveals that nearly half of 
all South Africans live on an income of less than R3000 per month.488 Considering that almost 
90% of poor South Africans are dependent on social grants for their monthly income489, it is safe 
to argue that a significant amount of South Africans are dependent on the state for the delivery of 
basic education. The payment of school fees is thus a barrier for many parents.490 Although 
South Africa has a high enrolment rate, the drop-out rate of learners is alarming.491 A recent 
survey by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits University reveals that one of the main 
                                                                                                                                                             
483 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.  
484 See definition section of the Equality Act.  
485 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted 25 June 1993 by the World Conference on Human 
Rights (“the Vienna Declaration”).  
486 Section 25 of the Vienna Declaration.  
487  Note 4 above, 20.  
488 “Development Indicators Mid- term Review” (2007) issued by the Presidency’s Policy and Advisory Service 
Unit available from http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2007/development_indicators.pdf [accessed 7 November 
2008].  
489 See note 264 above. 
490 Note 4 above, 23. 
491 As above, 25.  
The South African Human Rights Commission reports that South Africa has an average enrolment rate of 98% in 
grade 1.  However, the drop-out rate between grade 1 and 3 is 26% and between grade 9 and 10, 19, 6%.  
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reasons for non- attendance at schools is the inability to pay school fees.492 Thus, it is probable 
that the inability of parents to pay schools fees is one of the root causes for the disturbing drop-
out rate among learners. However, school fees are not the only barrier to basic education. Other 
access costs such as transport costs and costs related to school uniforms and textbooks also act as 
barriers to education.493 Although the Education Department attempts to alleviate this burden by 
providing transport to learners who live more than five kilometers from school,494 the CALS 
survey found that in poor communities a significant amount of the average income was spent on 
educational costs, including school fees, school transport costs, textbooks, uniforms and 
stationery.495 Although uniforms are not obligatory for the poor496, the Department is ineffective 
in conveying this information to parents 497 In sum, the discussion above indicates that despite 
the establishment of no fee schools and the fee exemption policy, poor parents are struggling to 
keep their children in school.498  
 
The South African Human Rights Commission reveals that the following incidents regularly 
occur in schools where parents are unable to afford school fees: sending learners home and 
withholding their school records until their fees are paid.499 Similar incidents include 
withholding books from learners and publicizing the names of learners whose fees are unpaid.500 
                                                 
492 Note 396 above, 33.  
493 Note 114 above, 10.  
494 Note 4 above, 24.  
495 Note 396 above. 33. CALS found that in communities where the average income was R877 per month, 32% of 
the household income was spend on educational costs.  
496According to National Plan of Action schools are prohibited from marginalizing learners in any way who cannot 
afford uniforms. See note 77 above, 33.  
497 Note 4 above, 24.  
498 Note 114 above, 10.  
499 Note 4 above, 24.  
500 http://etd.rau.ac.za/theses/available/etd-10122005-122303/restricted/AEIsmailDoctoralThesis2005.pdf [accessed 
7 November 2008].  
These practices persist despite recent amendments to the Schools Act, which explicitly outlaws the more malicious 
forms of discrimination against learners. In terms of the section 41(5) of the Education Laws Amendment Act, “ a 
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Even where learners have been granted exemptions, evidence suggests that these learners are 
stigmatized as poor and are being treated differently at schools.501  This includes learners being 
forced to sit on chairs as opposed to desks.502 In sum, the treatment of learners whose parents are 
unable to pay school fees is hurtful and demeaning. Despite anti-discriminatory laws, these 
learners are treated as inferior and unworthy of the same respect and concern shown to learners 
whose parents are able to pay their school fees. Thus, section 39 fundamentally impairs the 
dignity of poor learners.  
 
4.2.1.1 Impact of school funding system on black and/or poor learners 
South African learners constantly perform ‘among the worst in the world” in numeracy and 
literacy assessments.503 The majority of the present grade 9 class did not have the required 
standard of literacy or numeracy in 2005.504  Recent assessments performed by the Department 
of Education indicate that the competence of grade 6 learners in literacy and numeracy is far 
below standard.505 The disturbing reality reflects that the majority of learners who performed 
poorly are located at the previously disadvantaged schools.506 The performance of learners in 
                                                                                                                                                             
learner has the right to participate in the total school programme despite non-payment of compulsory school fees by 
his or her parent and may not be victimised in any manner, including but not limited to (a) suspension from classes; 
(b) verbal or non verbal abuse; (c) denial of access to cultural, sporting or social activities of the school; or (d) denial 
of a school report or transfer certificates”. 
501 Note 114 above, 10. 
502 As above.  
503http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_2357890,00.html[accessed 7 November 2008]. 
504http://www.smartxchange.co.za/images/Scarce%20and%20Critial%20Skills%20-
%20Dan%20Ellappa%20May%202008.ppt. [accessed 7 November 2008]. In 2005, 72% of present grade nine 
learners (then in grade 6) did not have the required standard of numeracy. Of these learners, 62% did not have the 
required standard of literacy.  
505 http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics/0,,2-7-12_2402117,00.html[accessed 6 November 2008]. 
506 In 2007, the Western Cape Education Department tested the literacy and numeracy levels of 71 874 learners 
across 1 034 schools across the Western Cape. The study shows that an average of 44, 8 % of learners have the 
required literacy level of a grade 6 learner. However, only 22, 7% of learners at the poorest schools could meet this 
standard, whilst 71, 7% of learners at the former advantaged schools were able to pass the required literacy level. 
The competency levels in numeracy show that 34,8% of learners at former advantaged schools possess the required 
numeracy level of a grade 6 learner, whilst only 1,7% of learners at the poorest schools could meet this standard. 
Although the numeracy performance of learners at the former advantaged schools is not good, the vast difference in 
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matric is also a clear indicator that there is a clear difference in quality between the former 
Model C schools and the previously disadvantaged schools.507 Uncertainty exists about the “the 
extent to which equality of educational resources is a necessary precondition of equality of 
educational outcome.”508 However, recently support has grown for analyses which indicate that 
there is a strong causal link between good learners’ performance and a well-funded school.509 
The Department of Education endorses this view by acknowledging that an improvement in 
resources is thought to improve the output in education or the performance of learners.510 
Because of the legacy of Apartheid, the majority of the previously disadvantaged schools 
experience conditions of a lack of basic infrastructure, basic inputs and a lack of well-qualified 
teachers. The current school funding system exacerbates this situation. The post provisioning 
model to re deploy well qualified teachers to poor schools has failed. Unlike the wealthy schools, 
poor schools are not able to appoint additional teachers from their budgets to make up for a lack 
of qualified teachers. In addition, these latter schools are forced to cope without the necessary 
resources if their school allocation money is inadequate.511 According to education analysts, 
South Africa is failing to provide quality education to eighty percent of its children who “find 
themselves trapped” in township and rural schools which have been described as “sinkholes, 
where children are warehoused rather than educated.”512 Without acquiring the necessary 
                                                                                                                                                             
performance between learners from the different schools is alarming.  See Die Burger “Syfers tel steeds teen 
leerders: Geletterdheid in gr. 6 het verbeter, maar arm skole kry swaar” (23 April 2008).  
507 One in every 10 white learners received an “A” aggregate in the 2007 matric examinations. One in every 1000 
black learners achieved the same. See note 504 above.  
508 Note 396 above, 23. 
509 As above. 
510 Note 77 above, 7. 
511  I am of course not suggesting that a lack of resources and available teachers are the only factors which impact 
negatively on the quality of education. Researchers have identified various other factors which may influence the 
quality of education in South Africa, such as ineffective leadership at schools and the unsuccessful implementation 
of outcomes based education. However, these issues fall outside the scope of this study and will not be addressed.  
512http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:JLU89HY8pncJ:www.dbsa.org/Research/Documents/Building%2520Edu
cation%2520Beyond%2520Crisis.doc+building+education+beyond+crisis&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=za9 
(accessed 7 November 2008.]  
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numeracy and literacy skills, these learners are confined to a life of unemployment or securing 
“only the most menial jobs.”513  In sum, the exclusion of black and /or poor learners from 
sufficiently benefiting under the school funding system affects them fundamentally. This 
exclusion has a grave impact on their dignity and prevents them from enjoying the other 
constitutional rights vested in them. I thus conclude that the school funding system unfairly 
discriminates against learners on the basis of race and/or economic condition.514 
 
4.2.1.2 The limitation enquiry  
If a finding of unfair discrimination is established, a further enquiry has to be made under the 
limitation clause to determine whether the discrimination is justifiable. 515  
Section 36 (1) of the Constitution provides:  
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the same purpose. 
 
The limitation enquiry involves a balancing exercise.516 The court weighs the purpose, effect and 
importance of the infringing law against the nature and extent of the right that is being 
                                                 
513 As above.  
514 Although I investigated unfair discrimination on the basis of race and socio-economic status in two separate 
enquiries, it is possible that in some instances, the two grounds overlap. Thus, certain learners may experience unfair 
discrimination on both grounds. In Harksen (note 374 above) , the Court confirmed this possibility at para 62: 
“There is often a complex relationship between these grounds. In some cases they relate to immutable biological 
attributes or characteristics, in some to the associational life of humans, in some to the intellectual, expressive and 
religious dimensions of humanity and in some cases to a combination of one or more of these features. The 
temptation to force them into neatly self-contained categories should be resisted.”  
515 Curie and De Waal (note 375 above) 350.  
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infringed.517 The various interests are balanced against each other on the basis of what is 
acceptable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.518 
Although the factors listed in section 36 are not exhaustive, they have become the focus of the 
limitation enquiry.519 I will now consider each factor. The first factor is the nature of the right. 
Here the court considers the importance of the right.520 Some rights are considered to be more 
significant than others.521 For instance, the Constitutional Court has held that the “rights to life 
and dignity are the most important of all rights.”522 Thus, the more important the right, the more 
compelling the reasons must be for the limitation.523 The second factor is the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation. The limitation must serve a purpose that is considered important by all 
reasonable citizens.524 Thirdly, the nature and extent of the limitation is considered. The issue is 
whether the limitation is a serious or minor infringement of the right.525 The “infringement of the 
right should not be more extensive than is warranted by the purpose that the limitation seeks to 
achieve.”526 Thus, if the infringement of the right is severe, it would be very difficult to justify 
the limitation of the right. The fourth factor is the relation between the limitation and the 
purpose. Where the law does not achieve the purpose it was designed to achieve, it is not 
reasonable to limit the right.527 If the law only has a minor impact on its purpose, the limitation 
will not be considered to be justifiable.528 The final factor is whether there are less restrictive 
means to achieve the same purpose. If there are less restrictive means that will achieve the same 
                                                                                                                                                             
516 As above, 341. 
517 As above.  
518 As above.  
519 As above.  
520 As above.  
521 As above. 
522 Makwanyane (note 27 above) para 144. 
523 Curie and De Waal (note 375 above ) 341.  
524 As above.  
525 As above. 
526 As above. 
527 As above. 
528 As above, 342. 
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purpose, but which will not restrict the right at all or restrict the right to a lesser extent, those 
means must be preferred.529 Thus, if such means do exist, the limitation will not be justifiable. 
 
(i) Is the unfair discrimination against learners justifiable? 
The importance of the right not to be unfairly discriminated against and the right to dignity are 
implicated by section 39 of the Schools Act. These two rights are inextricably linked to each 
other. The Constitutional Court has held that “at the heart of the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination is the recognition that under our Constitution all human beings, regardless of their 
position in society, must be accorded equal dignity.”530 In Makwanyane , the Constitutional 
Court held that the rights to dignity and life are the most important rights in the Constitution and 
must be valued above all other rights.531 In view of the importance of these rights, the 
justification for the limitation thereof must be very compelling.  Secondly, the importance of the 
purpose of section 39 must be considered. The charging of school fees serve three purposes: it 
secures an additional source of funding to the state which allows it to spend more of its own 
resources on disadvantaged schools,  it encourages parent participation in schools and promotes 
the accountability of the schools to the communities they serve.  In my view, these objectives 
will be considered as important by all reasonable South Africans. The third factor to consider is 
the extent to which the implicated rights have been infringed.  Although the objectives of section 
39 are important, it does not outweigh the harm done to learners through the denial of their 
rights. The marginalization of learners in former black schools is exacerbated by the effect of the 
discretion given to parents. Learners’ sense of self-worth is significantly harmed by the impact of 
section 39 as discussed above. Therefore, section 39 imposes a severe limitation on the 
                                                 
529 As above.  
530 Hugo (note 257 above) para 41.  
531 Note 27 above, para 144.    
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implicated rights. The fourth factor considers whether section 39 achieves the purpose it was 
designed to achieve.  It is reasonable to conclude that a law which requires parents to determine 
the amount of school fees at a school encourages parents to participate in the management of the 
school and promotes accountability of schools to the broader community. In respect of these two 
objectives, section 39 achieves the purposes it was designed for. The remaining objective of 
section 39 is that it provides an additional source of funding to the state which allows it to 
“implement preferential funding for poor schools.”532 According to the Department, poor schools 
are preferred in state funding to “ensure the redress of past inequalities in educational 
provision.”533 I have shown above that the discretion given to parents under section 39 results in 
the perpetuation of the existing inequality in the education system. Thus, section 39 is achieving 
the exact opposite of this specific purpose which it was designed for. The last question is the 
consideration of less restrictive means. The objectives contemplated by section 39 can be 
achieved without bestowing upon parents the discretion to determine the amount of school fees. 
The state can secure additional funding through various other means, including general 
taxation534 and if that is not enough, international assistance.535 Parent participation in the 
governance of schools is already being achieved through the establishment of school governing 
bodies.536 Likewise, parents’ participation in school governing bodies does provide an effective 
tool to ensure accountability by schools to their communities.537 In light of all the above, I 
                                                 
532 Note 401 above, para 152.  
533 As above, paras 16 and 40; section 34(1) of Schools Act. 
534 Verheyde (note 54 above) 21-22.  
535 See section 2.2.3.2.1 (a) above.  
536 In terms of section 16(1) of the Schools Act, the governance of every public school is vested in its governing 
body.  
Section 23 of the Schools Act mandates the election of parents, educators, non-educator staff and learners to the 
governing body of a school.  
537 Section 23 of Schools Act.  
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conclude that the nature and extent of the rights to equality and dignity outweigh the purpose, 
effect and importance of section 39. The limitation of these rights is therefore not justifiable. 
 
4.2.2 Remedy 
The Constitution grants the courts wide remedial powers.538 The courts “may make any order 
that is just and equitable” where there has been a violation of a constitutional right.539 In Fose v 
Minister of Safety and Security540, the Court held that “[a]ppropriate relief will in essence be 
relief that is required to protect and enforce the Constitution.”541 In Soobramoney, the Court held 
that the realization of [socio-economic rights] is dependent upon the resources available to the 
state.542 In Grootboom, the Court confirmed that “[the Constitution] does not expect more of the 
State than is achievable within its available resources.”543 Thus, in determining an appropriate 
remedy, the Court will take into account the financial constraints of the state.  
 
The South African government should be commended for the steps they have taken to make 
basic education accessible to poor learners. In particular, the abolishment of school fees in the 
poorest quintiles needs mentioning. Furthermore, the state has taken steps to make transport 
accessible to poor learners and deploying qualified teachers at disadvantaged schools. However, 
despite these efforts, this study indicates that learners in disadvantages schools are not receiving 
an adequate standard of basic education. The question is therefore not “what needs to be done?”, 
but “what more needs to be done?” Firstly, it is submitted that the state should acknowledge that 
                                                 
538 In terms of section 38, a court “may grant appropriate relief” where a right in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed.  
539 Section 172(1)(b).  
540 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC); 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) (Fose).  
541 Fose (note above) para 19. 
542 Note 260 above, para 11. 
543 Note 18 above, para 46.  
 
 
 
 
 97
there are certain core obligations engendered by the right to basic education that requires 
immediate realization. The state’s approach towards these core obligations has been one of 
progressive realization. However, as I have argued in this study, the state’s obligation to provide 
basic infrastructure, basic school inputs, qualified teachers, free primary education and non-
discrimination in disadvantaged schools are not subject to progressive realization. Secondly, in 
light of the importance of basic education and its central role in the realization of other 
constitutional rights, it is submitted that the state should prioritize the realization of the core 
obligations above other competing interests. In this regard, I agree with Liebenberg that  
“[a] failure to ensure…basic social provisioning should only be justifiable when resources are 
demonstrably inadequate, or other compelling justifications exist. The latter may include, for 
example, competing urgent priorities which are justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom.”544(footnotes omitted) 
 
Liebenberg proposes that the state is required to discharge the abovementioned evidentiary 
burden in assessing whether they are complying with minimum core obligations engendered by 
socio-economic rights.545 This approach is in part derived from international law discourse which 
also requires that the state’s failure to realize minimum core obligations is only justifiable if the 
state is able to show that it could not provide the appropriate resources because of circumstances 
beyond its control and that it could not secure the assistance of the international community. In 
line with this approach, it is submitted that the government’s failure to realize the minimum core 
obligations will only be justifiable if they are able to place  evidence before court, demonstrating 
that they do not have the required resources to spend on basic education or that other interests are 
more compelling. However, prioritizing basic education in budgetary allocations is not enough. 
                                                 
544 S Liebenberg “Socio-economic rights: revisiting the reasonableness review/minimum core debate” in S Woolman 
and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) 326.  
545 As above.  
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The state has already done so.546 Throwing money at the problem is clearly not the only solution. 
In addition, government should become far more vigorous in their approach to realizing the 
minimum core obligations. This entails utilizing existing resources to eradicate the existing 
inequality in our schools and to ensure that the minimum core obligations in respect of basic 
education are achieved. Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides:  
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
 
In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden547, Moseneke J shed light on section 9(2) by stating that 
“[r]estitutionary measures, sometimes referred to as “affirmative action”, may be taken to 
promote the achievement of equality. The measures must be “designed” to protect or advance 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to advance the achievement of equality.” 
The Constitution therefore authorizes the undertaking of affirmative action measures to advance 
those learners who have experienced unfair discrimination because of their lack of equal access 
to the benefits of the school funding system. In this regard, it is submitted that the state should 
consider affirmative action policies in education, such as the amalgamation of former Model C 
schools with disadvantaged schools and compelling qualified teachers to teach at disadvantaged 
schools. In light of the vast difference in resources between the former Model C schools and the 
disadvantaged schools as well as the difference in quality of education presented at these 
schools, it is submitted that directing money alone at the realization of the core obligations is not 
enough. Utilizing existing physical and human resources at former Model C schools is an 
                                                 
546 In the 2008 national budget, R121, 1 billion was allocated to education, the largest expenditure allocation by 
function in the budget. See note 446 above.   
547 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC); 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC) para 28.  
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immediately available measure. In my view, this is key in the realization of the right to basic 
education of black and /or poor learners.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5. Introduction 
This study has sought to address the impact of the school funding system on the right to basic 
education of poor learners. This study has established that the funding system has failed to 
ensure the realization of the right to basic education for learners who cannot afford the costs 
related to schooling. Moreover, it has shown that the method of funding perpetuates the 
entrenched inequality in the education system. This chapter highlights legislative and policy 
weaknesses in the school funding system and provides appropriate recommendations.  
 
5.2 Legislative weaknesses 
This study has revealed a very complex set of laws governing the school funding system. 
Notably, the legislation in place governing school fees warrants further discussion. Firstly, 
although it is lawful to charge school fees, it is unlawful to turn children away from schools that 
are unable to afford school fees. However, this study has shown that, at times schools are 
compelled to levy fees to make up for a shortfall in state funding. Hence, they resort to 
discriminatory practices to force parents to pay school fees. It has been submitted in this study 
that as long as schools are allowed to charge school fees, discriminatory practices against 
learners will persist. Secondly, legislation prohibits and allows no-fee schools to charge school 
fees at the same time. It is unlawful for no-fee schools to charge school fees. However, as soon 
as their public funding is inadequate, it becomes lawful to impose school fees on parents. 
Thirdly, the legislature vests the discretion of charging school fees and the amount charged in the 
parent community of a school. This study has shown that this results in unfair discrimination 
against learners on the basis of race and socio-economic status. Furthermore, it perpetuates the 
entrenched inequality in the education system. Based on all the reasons cited above, it is 
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recommended that the legislature resolve the complexity around these laws.  
 
5.3 Weaknesses in Policy 
A complete review of the Norms and Standards is required. This study has shown that poor 
schools are simply not receiving enough in public funding to meet all their needs. Presently, in 
determining the amount of funding to schools, the state is guided by the poverty ranking of the 
school. The calculation of the poverty levels of schools is miscalculated because it does not take 
into account data from schools itself, but is based on the relative poverty of the community 
around the school. It is suggested that in order to determine a more accurate amount that will 
satisfy the needs of learners at poor schools, the state should take into account data from the 
schools itself. Furthermore, it is suggested that in determining these allocations, the state should 
take into account all costs related to schooling, including those costs related to school uniforms 
and transport. Secondly, the current School Fee Exemption policy requires dire review. It is 
recommended that the state abolish the current formula to determine exemptions and implement 
a more coherent method. The culture of non-enforcement of exemptions also requires attention 
by the state. It seems as if parents’ ignorance of the exemption policy contributes greatly to this 
problem. The state should therefore embark on a campaign to inform parents of their right to be 
exempted from school fees. It is also suggested that the state should consider compensating those 
schools that do grant exemptions. Furthermore, it is recommended that the state impose some 
form of sanction against those schools which refuse to implement the exemption policy.  
 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
Our transformative Constitution has ushered in a new era in which all South Africans are entitled 
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to equal opportunities, including the attainment of free, adequate basic education. However, this 
study has revealed that the current school funding system has perpetuated the entrenched 
inequality in our schools and barred access to many black and/or poor learners to exercise their 
constitutional right to a basic education.   
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